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EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND THE
COMPELLING CASE OF WILLIAM RUMMEL
CHARLES WALTER SCHWARTZ*
INTRODUCTION
Last term the Supreme Court decided what
Newsweek called the "compelling case"1 of William
Rummel. In Rummel v. Estelle,2 the Supreme Court
upheld a life sentence imposed under a Texas
habitual criminal statute. The statute mandates a
life sentence upon conviction of a third felony.
3
The petitioner in Rummel argued that the applica-
tion of this statute to his three felony convictions-
three relatively small thefts, which in the aggregate
amounted to $229.11-constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the eighth amend-
ment.
This article inquires into the history of the eighth
amendment with an emphasis on the origins of the
proportionality argument used in Rummel. The ar-
ticle also explores the other legal issues raised by
the Rummel challenge in the Supreme Court. Fi-
nally, the article argues that the Supreme Court's
rejection of Rummel's eighth amendment argu-
ment is fundamentally sound and that the cost of
full review of the length of prison sentences far
outweighs the "compelling" nature of cases such as
Rummel.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN HISTORY
The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 4 The
wording is virtually identical to a provision found
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.5 Traditional
history explains this provision as outlawing torture
* Associate, law office of Vinson & Elkins, Houston,
Texas; Law Clerk to the Honorable Homer Thornberry,
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, 1977-79; LL.M. Harvard University, 1980; J.D.
University of Texas, 1977; B.S. University of Texas, 1975.
I The Court Comes Back, NEWSWEEK, October 8, 1979, at
60.
2 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980).
3 Rummel was convicted under TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925) which provides: "whoever
shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than
capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for
life in the penitentiary."
'U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2.
and barbarous punishments such as those imposed
during the "Bloody Assizes."
'
In 1685, CatholicJames II succeeded his brother,
Anglican Charles II, as the King of England.
Shortly thereafter, Charles' illegitimate son, James,
the Duke of Monmouth, launched an unsuccessful
invasion of England. This caused James II to cancel
the autumn assize of 1685. In its place he created
a special commission to try the rebels and ap-
pointed Chief Justice Jeffreys to lead it.
This special commission, now known, as the
"Bloody Assizes," conducted hundreds of trials for
treason in which those found guilty were executed
in the traditional English manner-the condemned
man was drawn on a cart to the gallows where he
was hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive,
disemboweled and his bowels burnt before him,
then beheaded and quartered.7
In 1688, William of Orange and his wife Mary,
at the invitation of Parliament, replaced James II.
William's first Parliament wrote what is now
known as the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The
cruel and unusual punishment provision of this
document is thought to be a direct reaction to the
"Bloody Assizes."
THE GRANUCCI THEORY OF AMERICAN
MISINTERPRETATION
In an important article in the California Law
Review,8 Anthony Granucci has suggested that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause in the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights of 1689 was not intended to
outlaw barbarous methods of punishment.9 He
argues that it was intended to outlaw punishments
"which were unauthorized by statute and outside
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court,"10 as well
6 See, e.g., Note, 24 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1910); Note, The
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and The Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Cruel and Unusual Punishment].
7A description of the various methods of English
executions can be found in 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *377.
a Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted":
The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
9 Id. at 859.
I1d. at 860.
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as to forbid disproportionate penalties." However,
Granucci claims that the American framers mis-
interpreted the English meaning of cruel and un-
usual punishments, thinking that their own eighth
amendment would outlaw only barbarous methods
of punishments.'
2
GRANUCCI'S CASE AGAINST THE "BLOODY ASSIZE"
THEORY
Granucci argues that there "is no evidence to
connect the cruel and unusual punishments clause
with the 'Bloody Assize.' ,13 First, Granucci notes
that the method of punishment employed during
the Bloody Assize continued to be acceptable long
after passage of the Bill of Rights of 1689. Similar
methods of execution were used even until the
nineteenth century.'4 Moreover, the Whigs, who
wrote the clause, suppressed the two Jacobite re-
bellions with the same strong methods employed
by the Stuarts.'5 Second, Granucci observes that a
leading member of the Bloody Assize, Sir Henry
Pollfexen, participated in drafting the Bill of
Rights. Surely, Granucci argues, Pollfexen would
not have condemned his own participation in the
assize as illegal.16 Finally, Granucci suggests that
since there is little mention of the assize in the
parliamentary debate concerning the Bill of
Rights, the causal connection between the assize
and the clause cannot be established. 7
GRANUCCI'S THESIS AS TO THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF
THE CLAUSE
Granucci finds evidence as to the original mean-
ing of the clause in (a) the trial of Titus Oates and
his "Popish Plot"'18 and (b) the traditional English
rule against disproportionate punishments.19
During the reign of protestant King Charles II,
Titus Oates, a minister of the Church of England,
announced that he had evidence of a plot to assas-
sinate the King and thereby place Catholic James
II on the throne.20 Oates' story was a complete
hoax, but as a result of his subsequent testimony,
r, Id. at 860-65.
13 Id. at 855.
14 Id. at 856.
15 Id.
161id.
18 Id. at 857-58.
'9 Id. at 844.
2o Oates testified that "two Jesuit priests were to shoot
the King with silver bullets, four 'Irish Ruffians' had
been hired to stab him, and if all failed, the Queen's
doctor ... was to poison him." Id. at 857.
at least fifteen Catholics were executed for trea-
son.
21
After James II succeeded to the throne in 1685,
Oates was tried and convicted of perjury. Oates
was sentenced to (1) a fine of 2,000 marks, (2) life
imprisonment, (3) whippings, (4) pillorying four
times a year, and (5) defrocking22
After William became the King of England in
1689, Oates petitioned Parliament for relief from
his sentence. The House of Lords denied Oates'
petition, but a minority report in the House of
Lords and a majority in the House of Commons
labeled Oates' punishment "cruel and unusual."' 3
Granucci contends this was the only contempo-
rary use of the phrase "cruel and unusual." He also
argues that Oates' sentence was neither dispropor-
tionate for a person who had caused the death of
many innocent persons, nor was it cruel and bar-
barous considering the contemporary standards2
Therefore, Granucci concludes that the phrase
must prohibit a "severe punishment unauthorized
by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the
court to impose. '
Granucci's second argument is that the phrase
"cruel and unusual punishment" was meant to
codify a long-standing English tradition against
disproportionate sentences. Granucci begins his ar-
gument with the biblical injunction that punish-
ment shall be "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth., 26 Granucci argues that by the year 900, this
injunction was codified in a sliding scale of fines.
After the Norman Conquest, however, the sched-
uled fine was replaced by a discretionary amerce-
ment. The discretionary nature of the amercement
later became a cause for concern. Granucci points
out that three separate chapters of the Magna
Carta dealt with discretionary and excessive
21 id.
2Id. at 858.
23 Id. at 858-59.
24 Id. at 859.
2 Id. (footnote omitted). In his John F. Sonnett Mem-
orial Lecture, Judge Mulligan of the Second Circuit
misreads Granucci on this score. Judge Mulligan has
Granucci arguing that Oates' sentence was cruel and
unusual because "a term of life imprisonment was dis-
proportionate to the crime of perjury." Mulligan, Cruel
and Unusual Punishment: The Proportionality Rule, 47 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 639, 641 (1979) (footnote omitted). In fact,
Granucci specifically disavows this argument. "Life im-
prisonment is used widely today and probably would not
be considered excessive in a case of perjury which had
resulted in erroneous executions." Granucci, supra note 8,
at 859.




amercements.2 The most important of the three
was that "[a] free man shall not be amerced for a
trivial offence, except in accordance with the de-
gree of the offence; and for a serious offence he
shall be amerced according to its gravity.,
29
Granucci concludes that by the year 1400, we
have expression of "the long standing principle of
English Law that the punishment should fit the
crime. That is, the punishment should not be, by
reason of its excessive length and severity, greatly
disproportionate to the offense charged." 30
THE AMERICAN MISINTERPRETATION THEORY
Granucci asserts that by 1689, England pro-
hibited punishments that were either excessive' or
outside of a court's jurisdiction to impose. Granucci
also states that England had never prohibited cruel
methods of punishment.3 2 Notwithstanding these
assertions, Granucci contends that the American
founders intended that the eighth amendment pro-
hibit cruel methods of punishment.3 Granucci ar-
gues that this anomaly was a result of American
misinterpretation of English law.
Granucci contends that the prohibition against
barbarous punishment is an American develop-
ment largely invented by Nathaniel Ward.3 Ward
drafted an early Massachusetts law known as the
Body of Liberties. Included in this law is the clause,
"For bodily punishments we allow amongst us
none that are inhumane, barbarous or cruel."
2 35
The American framers, according to Granucci,
intended to prohibit cruel methods of punishment
and erroneously thought that the English Bill of
Rights already did so. Granucci traces the confu-
sion to a passage in Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England which states that "the bill of rights
has particularly declared, that excessive fines ought
not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted: (which had a retrospect to some
unprecedented proceedings in the court of King's
Bench, in the reign of King James the second)."
36
Granucci argues that the Blackstone passage
does not refer to the Bloody Assize because the
2 Id. at 845.
2 Id. at 846 (quoting J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323
(1965)).
3 Id. (quoting R. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES
236 (1959)).
31 Id. at 847.32 Id. at 860.
3 Id.
3Id. at 851.
5 Id. (quoting R. PERRY, supra note 30, at 153).
36 Id. at 864 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7,
at * 372-73).
Bloody Assize was not a proceeding in the Court of
King's Bench.37 Instead, Granucci suggests that
Blackstone refers to the trial of Titus Oates, dis-
cussed in a prior section. Granucci also notes that
another passage in Blackstone contemplates cruel
methods of punishment as legal without even men-
tioning the cruel and unusual punishment clause.3
CRITICISMS OF THE GRANUCCI THEORIES
First, since Granucci admits that the American
framers originally intended to prohibit cruel meth-
ods of punishment, one must question the relevance
of his two proposed English meanings, even assum-
ing they are correct. Was the American framers'
desire to prohibit cruel methods of punishment any
less legitimate because they misunderstood history?
Similarly, should an English concept of proportion-
ality have any force in causing an American court
to alter an historically developed perception of the
eighth amendment?
Second, Granucci's two English meanings can
themselves be questioned. In his Sonnett Memorial
Lecture, Judge Mulligan questioned Granucci's
reliance on the trial of Titus Oates. Judge Mulligan
argues that Oates' eventual release from prison was
not attributable to concern that Oates had been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but
rather, was "an act of gratitude by William of
Orange ... who knew his friends and recognized
the instruments which helped him attain the
throne of England.
39
Granucci's contention that the English Bill of
Rights of 1689 was meant to prohibit dispropor-
tionate punishments can also be criticized. The
most obvious criticism is the fact that dispropor-
tionate punishment continued to occur with great
frequency following enactment of the English Bill
of Rights. According to Justice Marshall's concur-
ring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,4° in the year 1500
there were eight capital crimes. By the date of the
English Bill of Rights, 1689, there were almost fifty
capital crimes. By 1800, there were almost two
hundred capital crimes, prohibiting a whole range
of human activity.4 1 Certainly, this is a powerful
indictment of Granucci's argument that the Eng-
lish law followed a belief in the proportionality
3
1 Id. at 865.
3 Id. at 863-65.
' Mulligan, supra note 25, at 641 (quoting E. DAKERS,
TITUS OATES 319 (1949)).
40 408 U.S. 238, 334 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).41 See 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 24 (1883). See also D. Hay, Chapter 1 in AL-
BION'S FATAL TREE 18 (1975).
[Vol. 71
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concept. Granucci's apparent answer to this is
"[w]hether the principle was honored in practice
,,42
or not is an open question.
Finally, there is no causal connection between
belief in the proportionality principle and the
adoption of the English Bill of Rights. On the one
hand, Granucci discounts the Bloody Assize expla-
nation of the Bill of Rights because the assize was
mentioned only once during the debates in Parlia-
ment. On the other hand, Granucci is unable to
point to even one mention of a proportionality
concept during parliamentary debate.
A SECOND HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
PROPORTIONALITY CONCEPT IN THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
In 1975, two student authors proposed an alter
native historical justification for finding a propor-
tionality requirement in the eighth amendment.
43
These authors accept the traditional historical ex-
planation for the English Bill of Rights-that it
prohibits cruel methods of punishment.44 They also
accept the notion that the American framers in-
tended to prohibit barbarous punishments.4 5 But
the authors assert that the American framers were
also influenced by certain enlightenment thinkers,
particularly the Italian writer Cesare Beccaria, who
advocated proportionate punishments.
In 1764, Cesare Beccaria authored On Crimes and
Punishments.4 6 Beccaria's central thesis was that a
punishment should relate to the seriousness of the
crime. Two years later, Voltaire authored a Com-
mentary on Beccaria's treatise which was translated
along with the treatise into all the primary Euro-
pean languages.47
The student authors contend that Beccaria's pro-
portionality ideas were adopted in the eighth
amendment because (1) Beccaria's work was widely
read in early America;48 (2) John Adams once
quoted Beccaria in a speech to ajury while defend-
ing soldiers accused of the Boston Massacre; 49 (3)
Thomas Jefferson read Beccaria and adopted his
4 Granucci, supra note 8, at 847.43 Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weens v.
United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L.
REV. 783 (1975).
44Id at 784.45 Id.46 Id. at 808.47 Id. at 812. Apparently, English was one language, as
the authors state, "There were three American transla-
tions of Beccaria." Id. at 813.
48 Id. at 813.
49Id. at 813-14.
ideas of proportionality.'s Moreover, Jefferson at-
tempted to introduce a more proportionate sen-
tencing scheme in Virginia; (4) George Mason, the
author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, in-
cluded a provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishments.5 ' Mason, the authors assert, was
aware of Beccaria and agreed with his ideas; 52 (5)
some states included provisions in their constitu-
tions prohibiting disproportionate punishments;'
and (6) the framers of the eighth amendment
incorporated the state prohibitions against dispro-
portionate punishments. 4
CRITICISM OF THE THESIS
Acceptance of the Beccaria thesis requires several
giant assumptions of causal connection, all of
which are contrary to historical evidence.
First, one cannot find a causal connection be-
tween Beccaria's work and the known history on
the eighth amendment. Merely proving that
Thomas Jefferson read and agreed with Beccaria
proves nothing about the eighth amendment. Jef-
ferson was a widely read man; certainly no one has
seriously argued that all that he read was adopted
by reference in the Constitution.
Second, the student authors' critical assumption
is illogical. The authors assert that George Mason
thought the eighth amendment meant to prohibit
disproportionate punishments, and yet the authors
admit that Mason used the exact words of the
English Bill of Rights of 1689. The authors suggest
that this "may have been merely [a] linguistic
device." 5 Certainly, the authors' burden is to pre-
sent a more powerful explanation than that the
words with a fixed historical meaning may have
been selected in error. The authors of the state
constitutions knew precisely how to prohibit dis-
proportionate punishments and clearly did so.5
50Id. at 818: The authors call Jefferson the "medium
through which the Enlightenment ideas were put to
practical use .. and... [the] connecting link between
Beccaria and what was to become the eighth amend-
ment." Id. at 816.





H6Id. at 820-25. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18,
which directed that:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature
of the offense. No wise legislature will affix the same
punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the
like, which they do to those of murder and treason;
where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted
against all offenses, the people are led to forget the
1980]
CHARLES WALTER SCHWARTZ
Yet, the framers of the Bill of Rights did not adopt
the language of these provisions.
Third, although the debates on the adoption of
the eighth amendment are not detailed, what little
evidence there is clearly centers around a concern
to prevent the national government from initiating
barbarous methods of punishment. In Virginia,
George Mason 57 and Patrick Henry58 both spoke
of the necessity to prohibit the government from
using torture. In Massachusetts, a delegate spoke
of the same necessity.
59
Finally, one may accept the authors' historical
real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to
commit the most flagrant with as little compunction
as they do those of the lightest dye: For the same
reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both im-
politic and unjust. The true design of all punish-
ments being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind.
While the student authors contend that the framers of
the Bill of Rights intended to incorporate such propor-
tionality concepts, they can show no causal connection
in the relevant debates.
57 George Mason stated:
For that one clause expressly provided that no man
can give evidence against himself and that ... in
those countries where torture is used, evidence was
extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause
of the bill of rights provided, that no cruel and
unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore
torture was included in the prohibition.
3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1085 (R. Rutland ed.
1970), cited in Comment, supra note 43, at 828.
5 Patrick Henry said in opposition to the pre-Bill of
Rights Constitution:
In this business of legislation, your members of
Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing
fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel
and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by
your declaration of rights. What has distinguished
our ancestors? That they would not admit of tor-
tures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Con-
gress may introduce the practice of the civil law in
preference to that of the common law ... of tortur-
ing to extort a confession of crime.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 447-48 (J. Elliott ed.
1901), cited in Comment, supra note 43, at 828-29 n.216.
59 The delegate stated in the Massachusetts Conven-
tion:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these
gloomy circumstances is the consideration, that
Congress have to ascertain, point out, and deter-
mine what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on
persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere re-
strained from inventing the most cruel and unheard
of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and
there is no constitutional check on them, but that
racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild
instruments of their discipline.
Massachusetts Convention Debates, Jan. 30, 1788, at
111, cited in Comment, supra note 43, at 828 n.214.
interpretation in total and still legitimately ques-
tion the authors' conclusion that such proofjustifies
active judicial interference with legislatively se-
lected punishments. This is an argument discussed
in some detail later in this article.
HISTORICAL CONCLUSION
To the extent that we need to know "the discov-
erable intentions of those who wrote and ratified" 6
the eighth amendment, we can fairly doubt the
conclusion of Granucci and the student authors.
The traditional view that the eighth amendment
was meant to prohibit only cruel methods of pun-
ishment retains its vitality. Of course, rejection of
their thesis provides only a starting point for anal-
ysis. The next section traces the evolution of the
eighth amendment in the Supreme Court.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
Ironically, the first appearance of the eighth
amendment in the United States Supreme Court
was a proportionality challenge to a sentence im-
posed by a state. In Pervear v. Massachusetts,61 the
defendant had been convicted of maintaining a
tenement for the sale of liquors without a license.
He was sentenced to pay a fifty-dollar fine and
serve three months in a house of corrections.62 The
Supreme Court rejected Pervear's proportionality
argument by holding that the eighth amendment
did not apply to the states. The Court added in
dicta that it perceived nothing excessive or cruel in
the sentence.6
The eighth amendment did not command an
important opinion in the Supreme Court until the
territory of Utah decided to execute a condemned
prisoner by public firing squad. In Wilkerson v.
Utah,& the condemned prisoner argued that shoot-
ing as a mode of execution violated the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the eighth
amendment.65 The Supreme Court adopted the
traditional meaning of the eighth amendment:
"[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture,
such as those mentioned by the commentator re-
ferred to, and all others in the same line of unnec-
60 Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On
Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5
(1978).
6i 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 608 (1867).
62Id. at 609-10.
6 id.
0499 U.S. 130 (1878).
0 While not strictly an eighth amendment case, the
Territory of Utah could make no law inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
[Vol. 71
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essary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment
to the Constitution." 66 Since death by firing squad
was a common mode of military execution, the
Court had no difficulty in upholding it as a con-
stitutional method of punishment.
The third eighth amendment case to reach the
Supreme Court involved a New York prisoner who
argued that electrocution was an impermissible
method of punishment. 67 Since the Supreme Court
plainly held in Pervear that the eighth amendment
applied only to the national government, it is
difficult to understand why the Court found it
necessary to address the eighth amendment argu-
ment in this state case. Nevertheless, the Court did
address the eighth amendment question under the
rubric of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.
68
In In re Kemmler, the Court again adopted the
traditional rationale that the eighth amendment
was meant to prohibit "burning at the stake, cru-
cifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like.",69 The
Court held that a punishment is cruel and unusual
if it involves "something inhuman and bar-
barous. ' ,70 Although electrocution was unusual in
the sense that it was not an historical punishment,
the unquestioned good motive of the New York
661d. at 16. The "commentator referred to" was
Blackstone. Granucci makes a convincing argument that
the court misread Blackstone on this score. The Supreme
Court correctly described Blackstone, 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 7, at * 377:
Such is the general statement of that commentator,
but he admits that in very atrocious crimes other
circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were some-
times superadded. Cases mentioned by the author
are, where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the
place of execution, in treason; or where he was
disembowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in
high treason. Mention is also made of public dissec-
tion in murder, and burning alive in treason com-
mitted by a female. History confirms the truth of
these atrocities, but the commentator states that the
humanity of the nation by tacit consent allowed the
mitigation of such parts of those judgments as sa-
vored of torture or cruelty, and he states that they
were seldom strictly carried into effect.
99 U.S. at 135.
While the description of the Blackstone passage is
accurate, it is important to note that Blackstone never
states that these punishments were improper, nor does
this section cite the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Gran-
ucci argues that the American founders misinterpreted
this section of Blackstone as saying that cruel and unusual
punishments were prohibited by the English Bill of
Rights and by adoption, the eighth amendment.
7 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
68 Id. at 445-46.
6 Id. at 446.70 Id. at 447.
legislature in selecting that method of execution
saved it from constitutional attack.
The next important mention of the eighth
amendment in the Supreme Court came in Justice
Field's dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont.
71
O'Neil was a New York liquor merchant who had
:been convicted of 307 distinct offenses for selling
liquor illegally in the state of Vermont. He was
fined $20.00 for each offense along with $497.96 in
prosecution expenses. If O'Neil would be unable to
pay the fine, he was to serve out the fine at $3.00
a day, over 54 years at hard labor. O'Neil argued
that under the commerce clause, Vermont could
not constitutionally make the sale of goods by a
nonresident to residents a penal offense. The Su-
preme Court dismissed O'Neil's application for
writ of error stating that no federal question had
been properly presented.
In a twenty-nine-page dissent, Justice Field ar-
gued for twenty-four pages that a federal question
had been properly presented and that Vermont had
no constitutional power to make O'Neil's conduct
criminal. Despite O'Neil's failure to argue to the
Court that his punishment violated constitutional
guarantees, Justice Field also argued that the fifty-
four-year sentence violated the eighth amendment.
Justice Field accepted the notion that the eighth
amendment was designed to prohibit "punish-
ments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the
thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs,
and the like." 72 However, he asserted that the
eighth amendment also outlawed "all punishments
which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. 73
Justice Field determined that the fifty-four-year
sentence was unconstitutional for the underlying
offense because it was extremely severe and it was
greater than the punishment Vermont exacts for
burglary or highway robbery and six times greater
than Vermont's punishment for manslaughter, for-
gery, or perjury.74 Justice Field rejected the argu-
ment that O'Neil's sentence was justified as a
cumulative sentence for many separate offences,
because the sentence was "greatly beyond anything
required by any humane law for the offence."
75
71 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
72 Id. at 339 (dissenting opinion).
73 Id. at 339-40.
74 Id. at 338-39.75 Id. at 340. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice
Harlan joined by Justice Brewer also argued that the
sentence violated the eighth amendment. The majority
of the Court did not reach this issue because no assign-
ment of error was made. The majority, however, observed
that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states.
19801
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The first attempt to test Justice Field's O'Neil
dissent in the Supreme Court was Howard v. North
Carolina. 7 In Howard, two defendants were given
ten-year sentences and one defendant was given a
seven-year sentence for conspiracy to defraud. The
defendants argued that the sentences were uncon-
stitutionally severe under the eighth amendment.
In rejecting the argument, Justice Brewer stated,
"[t]hat for other offenses, which may be considered
by most, if not all, of a more grievous character,
less punishments have been inflicted, does not
make this sentence cruel.... Justice Brewer did
not set guidelines for determining what would be
a cruel and unusual punishment. He merely stated
that in light of the circumstances of this case, ten
years was not cruel.
The most important early eighth amendment
case was Weems v. United States. 78 In Weems, the
defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public
and official document. The crime required only
that the defendant intended to pervert the truth;
there was no requirement that the defendant have
a fraudulent intent or intend personal gain.78
Among other things, Weems received a fifteen-year
sentence in cadena temporal and a four-thousand-
peseta fine.
80
76 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
77 Id. at 135-36. Justice Brewer's opinion perpetuated
an unstated confusion about the eighth amendment's
application to the states. Justice Brewer obviously
thought that the states were subject to the eighth amend-
ment since he joined Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Neil.
However, in O'Neil a majority of the Court appeared to
reject this position. Justice Brewer's opinion certainly
does not purport to overrule O'Neil, but Howard clearly
reached an issue not appropriately addressed if the eighth
amendment did not apply to the states.
7"217 U.S. 349 (1910).79 Id. at 363.
80 The Court described the specifics of the sentence as
including:
A. Imprisonment for 15 years during which time
the prisoner shall always carry a chain at the
ankle and attached to the wrists. The prisoner
shall be employed at hard and painful labor and
shall receive no assistance whatsoever from out-
side the prison.
B. Accessory penalties:
1. Civil interdiction-Defendant has no rights
of parental authority, guardianship of person
or property, of participation in the family
council, of marital authority, of administra-
tion of property, and to dispose of personal
property by act intervivos.
2. Perpetual absolute disqualifications. The de-
fendant cannot vote or hold elected office,
and is disqualified from acquiring honors. He
loses all retirement pay.
3. Subjection to surveillance.
The Supreme Court held that this punishment
violated the Philippine Bill of Rights.8 ' Justice
McKenna, writing for the Court, held that it had
ordinarily been thought that the eighth amend-
ment protected against "inhuman and barb-
arous"
8 2 punishments. However, Justice McKenna
added that "punishment in the State prison for a
long term of years might be so disproportionate to
the offence as to constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment. ' ' as
Justice McKenna's analysis began with the prop-
osition that the words of the English Bill of Rights
were directed against the abuses of the Stuarts,8
but he also asserted that the American framers
conceived a broader prohibition than against mere
torture. Justice McKenna also alluded to a mean-
ing for the amendment that could change over
time.85 Applying this evolving standard, the Court
held Weems' sentence impermissible. The Court
did not precisely indicate its rationale, but there
are a number of arguments which support the
Court's position.
First, the Weems sentence may have been im-
permissibly long. This reading of Weems, albeit an
extreme reading, suggests that a fifteen-year sen-
tence for falsifying a public and official document
is unconstitutional. Justice McKenna supported
the position that a sentence may be unconstitu-
(a) Civil authorities allowed to fix the per-
son's domicile and the person is not al-
lowed to change domicile without the
written permission of the authorities.
(b) Person must obey the rules of inspection.
(c) Person must adopt some trade, art, in-
dustry or profession if he does not have
means of subsistence.
Id. at 364-65.
si The Philippine Bill of Rights was held to have the
same meaning as the eighth amendment. Id. at 367.
ssld. at 368.
'8 Id. McKenna quoted directly from a Massachusetts
case for this proposition. McDonald v. Commonwealth,
173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874 (1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 311
(1901).
s4 217 U.S. at 372.
85 They were men ofaction, practical and sagacious,
not beset with vain imagining, and it must have
come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty
by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain
or mutilation... [W]e cannot think that it was
intended to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts,
or to prevent only an exact repetition of his-
tory ... . Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application
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tional because of its disproportionate length.86
Moreover, McKenna compared the Philippine
punishment for the crime of false entry with the
similar federal crime of embezzlement for which
the maximum sentence was two years imprison-
ment and a fine of twice the amount embezzled. 7
Second, the condition of imprisonment may
have been so poor as to render his sentence uncon-
stitutional. During his imprisonment, Weems
served under cadena temporal. He had his hands and
feet chained and performed hard and painful la-
bor. Additionally, Weems was allowed no outside
contact.s
Third, the post-imprisonment effects of the sen-
tence may render it unconstitutional. The Weems
Court describes the disabilities long attached to the
punishment:
He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime,
forever kept within voice and view of the criminal
magistrate, not being able to change his domicil
without giving notice to the "authority immediately
in charge of his surveillance," and without permis-
sion in writing. He may not seek, even in other
scenes and among other people, to retrieve in full
from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him
and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if
not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress
as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential
liberty. No circumstance of degradation is omitted.'
Fourth, the Weems Court may have viewed the
punishment as a combination of the three factors
mentioned above: (1) length of sentence; (2) con-
dition of imprisonment; and (3) post-imprisonment
(accessories of) punishment. This combination the-
ory most logically explains Weems because the in-
dividual factors, judged by the standards of the
day, did not amount to cruel and unusual punish-
17 Id. at 380-81.
88 Id. at 366. In speaking of this condition, the Court
stated:
It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not
omitted. He must bear a chain night and day. He
is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What
painful labor may mean we have no exact measure.
It must be something more than hard labor. It may
be hard labor, pressed to the point of pain. Id.
89 Id. In addition to the vivid description of the "acces-
sory" punishment, the Supreme Court discussed whether
the accessory punishment could be severed from the
imprisonment so as to make the punishment constitu-
tional. The Court held that the postimprisonment pun-
ishment could not be severed. Id. at 381-82. Significantly,
the Court would not have had to contemplate this pos-
sibility if the prison sentence standing alone had consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. This discounts the
mere length of sentence explanation of Weems.
ment. In Howard v. North Carolina,90 a unanimous
Supreme Court rejected an eighth amendment at-
tack on a ten-year sentence for conspiracy to de-
fraud. It is doubtful that the additional five-year
sentence for the Weems offense accounts for the
differing decisions in Weems and Howard.
The fact that at the time of Weems the federal
courts had long maintained a hands-off policy in
prison affairs,9' militates against the argument that
Weems was strictly a condition-of-servitude case.
There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that
the conditions imposed on Weems were per se
unconstitutional. The Court's analysis proceeds
from the proposition that the conditions imposed
on Weems were improper, not that the conditions
themselves were improper.
Finally, the post-imprisonment punishments dif-
fer only in degree from disabilities imposed today
for conviction of a felony and conditions imposed
for discretionary parole. Inability to hold public
office and loss of franchise frequently accompany
convictions of a felony.
These factors demonstrate that the most reason-
able reading of Weems is that the various factors
discussed coalesced in both condition and intensity
of punishment to violate the eighth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
It would be unfair to characterize Weems as merely
holding that the sentence selected by the Philippine
Court was disproportionate as to length. It would
be equally unfair to characterize the Weems result
in terms of the conditions of punishment. Perhaps,
the uncertainty surrounding Weems explains why
the Weems case never became the foundation for a
developed eighth amendment proportionality doc-
trine.
Another possible reason for the Weems failure to
take hold is the exceptionally powerful dissent of
Justice White.92 In his dissent, Justice White read
the majority opinion as requiring proportional
punishments. 93 His reading is, of course, a product
of the dissenter's right of exaggeration, but it none-
90 191 U.S. 126.
" See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119, 139 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871):
"[prisoners are] slave[s] of the State"). The "hands off
doctrine" is described in Fox, The First Amendment Rights
of Prisoners, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972). See also
Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future
of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J.
CRiM. L. &C. 211 (1980).
Mr.Justice White wasjoined by Mr. Justice Holmes.




theless served as a vehicle for an historical view of
the meaning of the eighth amendment. According
to Justice White, the primary purpose of the eighth
amendment in history was to prevent barbarous
methods of punishment: "It may not be doubted,
and indeed is not questioned by anyone, that the
cruel punishments against which the [Bill of
[R]ights provided were the atrocious, sanguinary
and inhuman punishments which had been in-
flicted in the past upon the persons of criminals."
4
Justice White also thought that the eighth
amendment prohibited courts from ordering pun-
ishments that were beyond their jurisdiction. He
agreed on this point with the Granucci thesis and,
in fact, both Granucci and Justice White point to
the trial of Titus Oates as an explanation for this
second meaning of the eighth amendment.95
In sharp disagreement with the Granucci thesis,
however, Justice White argued that proportional
punishments were not required by the English Bill
of Rights. For proof of this proposition, Justice
White relied on the English methods of punishment
from the 1600s through the American Revolu-
tion.9 Justice White quoted Stephen on the sever-
ity of English law: "there can be no doubt that the
legislation of the eighteenth century in criminal
matters was severe to the highest degree, and des-
titute of any sort of principle or system."' 7 Justice
White argued that the American framers were fully
aware of the harsh nature of prevailing English
law. Even so, they chose to adopt the wording of
the English Bill of Rights prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishments.9 8 The dissent argues that
this fact demonstrates that the American framers
intended to adopt the "well understood meaning"
I find it impossible to fix with precision the meaning
which the court gives [to the eighth amendment]
... [TIhe court interprets the inhibition against
cruel and unusual punishment as imposing upon
Congress the duty of proportioning punishment
according to the nature of the crime, and casts upon
the judiciary the duty of determining whether pun-
ishments have been properly apportioned in a par-
ticular statute, and if not to decline to enforce it.
Id.
9Id. at 390.
95 Id. Justice White also believed that permissible cor-
poral punishments could not legally be applied in an
excessive manner.
9Id. at 393.
97 Id. (quoting J. STEPHEN, supra note 41, at 470-71).
98 Id. at 394-95.
of the English Bill of Rights.9 Moreover, Justice
White noted that the drafters of state constitutions
were aware of the sanguinary nature of the criminal
law and specifically addressed the problem." °
In his final argument, Justice White pointed out
that the same Congress that wrote the Bill of Rights
also provided the death penalty for counterfeit-
ing.' ° ' This historical exegesis led Justice White to
conclude that the eighth amendment had a specific
and ascertainable meaning-the prohibition of
barbarous punishment-and that to limit legisla-
tive discretion to select the punishment of crime
violated "the elementary rules of construction.''
°0 2
It is one of the more curious phenomena in the
history of the Supreme Court that the limits and
ambiguities of the Weems case did not become the
foundations for arguments in future cases. It is
unlike lawyers to fail to exploit the uncertainties of
a case. But, for whatever reason, the potential of
the Weems case never came into fruition.10 3 Appar-
ently, the Supreme Court read Weems as limited to
its special circumstances. In Badders v. United
States,10 4 the Supreme Court through Justice
Holmes, a dissenter in Weens, rejected an eighth
amendment attack on a five-year sentence for
fraud. In rejecting the argument, the Court failed
to cite Weems and mentioned only Howard v. Flem-
ing.105 Moreover, the lower federal courts never
adopted an expansive reading of Weems. Among
the circuit courts, the Second,'t 6  Fifth,0 7
99 Id.
'0 Id. See, e.g., the New Hampshire Declaration of
Rights, found in note 56, supra.
fo1 Id. at 399-400. Justice White concluded that the
caselaw in the Supreme Court and in the various state
jurisdictions, supports the traditional view of the meaning
of the eighth amendment. Among the state and territory
cases relied on by Justice White were State v. White, 44
Kan. 514, 25 P. 33 (1890) (upholding a five-year sentence
imposed on a 16-year-old boy for statutory rape); and
Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 721, 65 P. 169 (1901)
(upholding a death penalty for attempted train robbery).
Id. at 402-07.
"°2Id. at 410.
'03 In Note, Disproportionality In Sentences of Imprisonment,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1119-20 (1979), the student
author suggests that the lack of a fuller development of
Weems is not surprising because the vast majority of
challenges to length of sentences do not rise to a consti-
tutional level.
'0o 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
105 191 U.S. 126.
"o6 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
"' Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 437 (5th
Cir. 1938).
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Seventh,'09 Eighth,'09 and Tenth, ° all flatly re-
jected any power to review the length of a legisla-
tively selected prison sentence.
Following the hostile reception Weems received
in the lower federal courts, the eighth amendment
did not make a significant reappearance in the
Supreme Court until the State of Louisiana's trav-
eling electric chair malfunctioned in an attempt to
execute the convicted murderer, Willie Francis. In
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,"' Francis argued
that Louisiana's second attempt to electrocute him
violated the eighth amendment. The Supreme
Court rejected Francis' argument because Louis-
iana did not have as its "purpose to inflict unnec-
essary pain."
' 12
Eleven years later, in 1958, the eighth amend-
ment made another unusual appearance in the
Supreme Court. As punishment for wartime deser-
tion, Congress provided for forfeiture of citizenship.
In Trop v. Dulles,"3 a four-member plurality of the
Court struck down this penalty because "[t]he
civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanim-
ity that statelessness is not to be imposed as pun-
ishment for crime.""' 4 Moreover, the Court held
that the selected punishment violated "the evolving
standards of decency"115 implicit in the eighth
amendment. In addition, by negative implication
the Trop Court recognized the disproportionality
principle: "Since wartime desertion is punishable
by death, there can be no argument that the
penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation
to the gravity of the crime.",1
6
In Robinson v. California,"7 another nontraditional
challenge arose under the eighth amendment. Cal-
ifornia had made it a crime to "be addicted to the
use of narcotics.""' The Supreme Court held that
as a matter of substantive criminal law, under the
eighth amendment, a state may not punish the
"status" of narcotic addiction.
Robinson was read as creating a potential revolu-
L0s United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899, 902-03 (7th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1946).
109 Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir.
1930).110 Edwards v. United States, 206 F.2d 855, 857 (10th
Cir. 1953).
. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
112 Id. at 464.
113 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
n4Id. at 102.
SId. at 101.
116 Id. at 99.
"7 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
118 CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1962).
tion in substantive criminal law." 9 Stretched to the
limit, Robinson could be read as interdicting crimi-
nal punishments for any crime caused by illness or
any criminal behavior caused by an uncontrolled
impulse. Fortunately, in Powell v. Texas, 20 the Su-
preme Court ended speculation about an expansive
meaning of Robinson and upheld a conviction for
public intoxication and distinguished between that
offense and the status of chronic alcoholism.1
2
'
While the Supreme Court seemed enamored
with exotic eighth amendment claims for many
years, three Justices returned to traditional issues
in their dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari in
Rudolph v. Alabama.12 In Rudolph, the defendant had
been sentenced to death for rape and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Justice Goldbergjoined by
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, arguing
that the Court should "consider whether the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution permit the imposition of the
death penalty on a convicted rapist who had nei-
ther taken nor endangered a human life."'3
Justice Goldberg posed three questions he
thought relevant under the eighth amendment."24
First, he asked if the death penalty for rape violated
the Trop v. Dulles "evolving standards of de-
cency."' 25 He pointed to the fact that few civilized
nations currently punished rape with the death
penalty.12 6 Second, Justice Goldberg argued that
the Court should determine if the death penalty
was disproportionate to the crime of rape.127 Fi-
nally, he suggested that the Court should ascertain
if permissible societal interests could adequately be
served by a penalty less severe than death. 128
The importance of this dissent is not limited to
just death penalty litigation. The dissent is also
important because three Justices of the Supreme
Court were making certain operating assumptions
about eighth amendment analysis which were by
no means settled law. First, the Trop v. Duties test,
119 See Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 6.
'20 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
121 Robinson also held the eighth amendment enforcea-
ble against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
370 U.S. 660.
'2 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (denying cert.). See also Packer,
Making The Punishment Fit The Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv.
1071 (1964).
12" 375 U.S. 889.
124 id.
'25 Id. at 889-90.





subscribed to by four Justices, arose in a context
far different than the one in Rudolph. Justice Gold-
berg's apparent willingness to test "evolving stan-
dards of decency" through the vehicle of a United
Nations survey was not an unassailable doctrinal
device. Second, Justice Goldberg read Weems v.
United States as unambiguously adopting propor-
tionality analysis, despite the confusion in the opin-
ion itself and in the lower courts.' 2' Finally, Justice
Goldberg listed the permissible aims of punishment
as deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation. At the
time of his writing, Justice Goldberg could point
to no case holding that retribution was an imper-
missible goal of punishmentst3
The mounting public concern about the propri-
ety of the death penalty in America resulted in
numerous challenges to that penalty. The original
challenges were grounded in procedural due pro-
cess. For example, "death qualified" juries were
challenged in Witherspoon v. Illinois'31 and unguided
sentencing discretion was challenged in McGuatha
v. California. 3 2 Inevitably, the challenge came un-
der the rubric of the eighth amendment and after
1971 the proportionality principle was frequently
developed within these cases.
In Furman v. Georgia,'3 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine if "the imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty...constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?"'3 In a per
curiam opinion the Court answered this question in
the affirmative without a statement of reasons.
Each Justice, however, filed a separate opinion
making it impossible to ascribe a single rationale
for the Court's action.
In Furman and its two companion cases, Jackson
v. Georgia'35 and Branch v. Texas, 3 ' each petitioner
was a black sentenced to death. Petitioners Jackson
and Branch had been convicted of rape and made
a proportionality argument. Nonetheless, the Court
focused on the constitutionality of the death pen-
'2 Id. at n.4.
130 The case that gives Justice Goldberg his strongest
argument is Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949): "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective
of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal juris-
prudence."
... 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
'32402 U.S. 183 (1971).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
'
3 4 Id. at 239.
'3Id. at 238.
136 Id.
alty under the eighth amendment generally. Con-
sequently, this article describes the various opinions
only to the extent that they advance eighth amend-
ment theory or proportionality analysis.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion suggested
that since the death penalty was disproportionately
applied to minorities and members of unpopular
groups, the penalty violated "theme[s] of equal
protection.. .implied in 'cruel and unusual' punish-
ments."' 37 According to this theory the death pen-
alty is unconstitutional if it is administered arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily. Under the Douglas test
a statistical imbalance would establish the impro-
priety of the penalty."t 0
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion urged the
Court to adopt a "less drastic means" test:
"[A]lthough the determination that a severe pun-
ishment is excessive may be grounded in a judg-
ment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the
more significant basis is that the punishment serves
no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe
punishment."'39
In his concurrence, Justice Stewart found it un-
necessary to consider whether the death penalty is
per se unconstitutional. Instead, Justice Stewart
determined that the death penalty as currently
imposed was wantonly and freakishly applied and
therefore violated the eighth amendment."'
Similarly, Justice White believed the death pen-
alty so infrequently imposed and the threat of
execution too attenuated to constitutionally serve
the criminal justice system.14 1
Justice Marshall wrote the final concurring opin-
ion in Furman. He concluded that the death penalty
was per se unconstitutional because it no longer




37 Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'38Justice Douglas admitted that there was no inten-
tional discrimination or improper motivation in the cases
before him: "We cannot say from facts disclosed in these
records that these defendants were sentenced to death
because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to
an effort to divine what motives impelled these death
penalties." Id. at 253. Justice Douglas' test is flatly at
odds with a later Supreme Court reading of the equal
protection clause in Washington v. Davis, 423 U.S. 820
(1976). The Fifth Circuit has read the Washington v. Davis
standards to apply to death penalty litigation. See Spin-
kellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
"z 408 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring). Mr.
Justice Marshall suggested a similar test. Id. at 331
(Marshall, J., concurring).
"
4 0 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring). Compare Ely,
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Four Justices dissented in Furman. The dissents
of Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger are
relevant to the proportionality question. Justice
Powell recognized a proportionality element in the
eighth amendment and discussed the concept in
the two death-for-rape cases pressed before the
Court.1
43
He described the Weems case in terms consistent
with those argued here: "Finding the sentence
grossly excessive in length and condition of im-
prisonment, the Court struck it down."'"4 However,
Justice Powell argued that the power to declare a
legislatively selected punishment should be exer-
cised in only extreme cases.
14
Consistent with this view, Justice Powell argued
that the death penalty for rape was not per se
disproportionate under the eighth amendment. In-
stead, he advocated a case-by-case adjudication to
discern those penalties "factually falling outside
the likely legislative intent, 146 but nonetheless tech-
nically appropriate. In reaching this position Jus-
tice Powell discussed Ralph v. Warden, 147 in which
the Fourth Circuit declared the death penalty un-
constitutional for rape where life is not endangered.
A separate opinion by Chief Judge Haynsworth in
Ralph argued that the death penalty for rape was
constitutional only when the victim suffered "a
grievous physical or psychological harm."' 48 Justice
Powell rejected the tests advanced by the Fourth
Circuit and ChiefJudge Haynsworth because "the
threat of serious injury is implicit in the definition
supra note 60, at 51. ("Lenin used to claim this godlike
gift of divination of the people's 'real interests'").143 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"44 Id. at 457.
145 Id. at 458.
These cases, while providing a rationale for gaug-
ing the constitutionality of capital sentences im-
posed for rape, also indicate the existence of neces-
sary limitations on the judicial function. The use of
limiting adjectives in the various expressions of this
test found in the opinions grossly excessive, greatly
disproportionate emphasizes that the court's power
to strike down punishments as excessive must be
exercised with the greatest circumspection .... This
Court is not empowered to sit as a court of sentenc-
ing review, implementing the personal views of its
members on the proper role of penology. To do so
is to usurp a function committed to the Legislative
Branch and beyond the power and competency of
this Court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
146 Id. at 457-58.
147 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
942 (1972). Ralph is discussed infra in the text accompa-
nying notes 308-10.
1
48 Id. at 794.
of rape"'149 and the Haynsworth standard is "im-
possible to gauge."" Nevertheless, Justice Powell
viewed these attempts at categorization as "groping
toward"'15 1 appropriate application of the eighth
amendment proportionality concept.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent took issue with the
test advanced by Justice Brennan that a punish-
ment violates the eighth amendment if a less drastic
punishment can satisfy the legislative purpose."1
2
The Chief Justice argued that it is empirically
impossible"53 to prove this proposition. In addition,
he stated that putting the burden of justifying a
punishment on the state could result in destruction
of the corrections system because no proof could
show that the legislatively selected punishment is
"a more effective deterrent" 1" than all other pun-
ishments.
One commentator has aptly described Furman as
a remand to the states. 1 The reaction was decisive.
Within four years of Furman, thirty-five states and
the United States Congress passed laws providing
for the death penalty. 1 " This reaction undermined
the "standards of decency" argument posited by
Justices Marshall and Brennan.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 57 seven Justices approved the
death penalty against an eighth amendment at-
tack.l58 The plurality opinion for the Court recog-
nized the proportionality principle, but it clearly
held that the death penalty for murder was not




151 Id. at 460-61.
'52 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 395-96.
"5 Id. at 396. In People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 128,
371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 491, 332 N.E.2d 338, 353, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 950 (1975), the New York Court of Appeals
misread this section as having the Chief Justice "flatly
reject[ing] disproportionality analysis," not just the "less
drastic means" test as an aspect of the analysis. Moreover,
in his dissent in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 604
(1977), the ChiefJustice stated, "I accept that the Eighth
Amendment's concept of disproportionality bars the
death penalty for minor crimes."
155 Alschuler, Burger's Failure: Trying Too Much to Lead,
Nat. L.J., Feb. 18, 1980, at 27 n.4.
1'6 The reaction is catalogued in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976).
157id.
'ss The Justices did so through four separate opinions.
The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Stewart
and joined by Justices Powell and Stevens. Justice White
authored a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger also
wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices White and




disproportionate: "[Wie cannot say that the pun-
ishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime.
It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most
extreme of crimes.""
9
Along with the Georgia statute in Gregg, the
Supreme Court examined four other death penalty
statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina,'6° Roberts v.
Louisiana,16 Proffitt V. Florida,'62 andJurek v. Texas.'6
Generally stated, mandatory death penalties were
declared unconstitutional and statutes that gave
juries guidance were found constitutionally per-
missible. Thereafter, in Lockett v. Ohio,'6 4 a plurality
of the Court found the Ohio death penalty statute
unconstitutional'because it did not allow the sen-
tencing authority full discretion in determining
whether the defendant should be executed. 6 5
"59 428 U.S. at 187 & n.35.
60 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
16' 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
162 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
1'6428 U.S. 262 (1976).
'r 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
165 The McGautha to Furman to Griggs to Lockett devel-
opment has aptly been described as a U-turn. See J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
ViEw 174 (1980). The apparent contradictions in this
result are explained by the voting behavior of Justices
White and Stewart. See Alschuler, supra note 155, at 27
n.4. Very roughly stated, we may now say that the law
of the death penalty is presently a rejection of McGautha.
In the last Term the Supreme Court decided three
death penalty cases. Two of these cases are relatively
unimportant. In Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980),
the Supreme Court held that Alabama could not consti-
tutionally prohibit a jury from considering possible guilt
to a lesser included offense raised by the evidence. Since
Alabama juries were charged that they must either return
a guilty verdict to the capital offense charged or set the
defendant completely free, the similarity of Alabama
procedure with the mandatory death penalties disap-
proved in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), is
striking. In Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980), the
Court applied Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968), to a Texas statute that excluded jurors because
they were unable to take an oath that the mandatory
penalty of death or life imprisonment would not "affect
[their] deliberations on any issue of fact."
The important eighth amendment case in the Court
involving the death penalty during the last term is God-
frey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980). In Godfrey, a
plurality opinion held that the Georgia Supreme Court
adopted an overly broad and vague definition of the
Georgia capital murder statute that makes "outrageous
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" murder punish-
able by death by affirming a death sentence imposed on
a defendant who deliberately and methodically murdered
his wife and mother-in-law with a shot gun. Godfrey raises
the distressing spectre that the Supreme Court might
individually determine the facts in every death penalty
case. Also in that case, the Court refused an opportunity
Following the death penalty cases, the eighth
amendment appeared in the Supreme Court in a
more mundane posture. In Ingraham v. Wright, 68 a
class of Florida students alleged that corporal pun-
ishment in state supported schools deprived them
of their eighth amendment rights. Since it had
become accepted that corporal punishment in
prisons16 7 violated the eighth amendment, it would
seem a small step to outlaw corporal punishment
in schools. The Supreme Court rejected the anal-
ogy, holding that the eighth amendment protected
only those convicted of a crime.'6 8 Ingraham is also
important for proportionality purposes because it
is the first opinion with a clear majority of Jus-
tices' 69 to unambiguously recognize a proportion-
ality element under the eighth amendment.
170
Another important eighth amendment case in
the Supreme Court involved the long-standing ob-
jection to the death penalty for rape. In Coker v.
Georgia,' a prisoner serving a life sentence for two
rapes, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and murder
escaped from confinement and raped a third
woman. The prisoner was convicted of the third
rape and sentenced to death under a Georgia stat-
ute that allowed the death penalty for rape under
three specific aggravating circumstances:
(1) that the rape was committed by a person with
a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
to find the death penalty a disproportionate punishment
for a domestic slaying occurring under emotionally
charged circumstances and ruled instead that the Georgia
Statute was unconstitutionally vague. See generally Note,
Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty, 71 J. CRiM. L. & C.
538 (1980).
'6 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
67 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580-81
(8th Cir. 1968).
i68 430 U.S. at 664.
9 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart, Black-
mun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. A dissent
written by Justice White and joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens took issue with the Court's central
proposition-that the eighth amendment applies only to
the criminal process.
'70 430 U.S. at 667:
These decisions recognize that the cruel and un-
usual punishments clause circumscribes the criminal
process in three ways: First, it limits the kinds of
punishment that can be imposed on those convicted
of crimes...; second, it proscribes punishment
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,
e.g., Weems v. United States...; and third it im-
poses substantive limits on what can be made crim-
inal and punished as such.
171 433 U.S. 584. See also Note, Coker v. Georgia: Dispro-
portionate Punishment and the Death Penaly for Rape, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1714 (1978).
[Vol. 71
EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
(2) that the rape was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of another cap-
ital felony, or aggravated battery; or
(3) that the rape was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or aggravated battery of the
victim.
1
In Coker the jury found the first two aggravating
circumstances: that Coker had committed the rape
after having been convicted of a capital felony, and
that he had committed the rape in the course of
another capital felony-armed robbery. The third
possible aggravating circumstance, torture to the
victim, was not charged because the Coker rape
did not involve physical torture other than the
agony of the rape itself.
When considering the question before the Court,
the Coker plurality'"3 refused to view Coker's crime
as "rape plus." First, the plurality held that Coker's
other convictions "do not change the fact that the
instant crime being punished is a rape not involv-
ing the taking of a life."' 4 Second, the Court
discounted the second aggravating circumstance-
rape accompanied by armed robbery-because the
jury returned only a life sentence for the separate
armed robbery offense. 75 Finally, the plurality
stated that any uncharged aggravating circum-
stance also would fail to change the character of
the rape because "it would seem that the defendant
could very likely be convicted, tried, and appro-
priately punished for this additional conduct.',
176
'7 433 U.S. at 598-99.
'"Justice White authored the Court's opinion, joined
by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justices
Brennan and Marshall filed separate concurring opinions
on per se grounds. Justice Powell filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion.
1'74 33 U.S. at 599.
17 ld. Coker was also tried for armed robbery. The
aggravating circumstance of that felony was Coker's prior
capital conviction. The jury returned a life sentence on
the armed robbery count. Apparently the Court did not
consider whether or not a jury could logically find that
rape with a past conviction for murder was more serious
than armed robbery with a prior conviction for murder.
Perhaps a more logical explanation for the Court's
action is alluded to in a footnote. In Gregg v. Georgia,
233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), affid, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to sustain
a death sentence for armed robbery, apparently because
it was excessive. Since the second aggravating circum-
stance in Coker was the capital offense of armed robbery,
it is odd that armed robbery, while not a permissible
capital offense, is a permissible aggravating circumstance
under a death penalty law that requires rape plus another
capital felony. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 599 n.15.
176 433 U.S. at 599-600 n.16.
Since the plurality of the Court was not willing
to consider that the Coker rape affected societal
interests different from a mere physical rape, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the death penalty for rape is per se unconstitution-
ally disproportionate under the eighth amend-
ment.
177
Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated
that according to Gregg v. Georgia, a punishment is
excessively cruel under the eighth amendment if
the punishment "is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime."' 78 In deciding Coker, Justice
White examined the incidence of the death penalty
in jurisdictions throughout the United States to
determine if the punishment was grossly dispro-
portional. According to the opinion, in 1925 eight-
een states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government authorized the death penalty for
rape. 7 9 Just prior to the decision in Furman v.
Georgia, the number of jurisdictions had declined
to sixteen states and the federal government.
18
After Furman invalidated all the existing death
penalty statutes, thirty-five states and the federal
government re-enacted the death penalty for cer-
tain offenses. However, out of the thirty-six juris-
dictions responding to Furman, only three included
rape of an adult woman as a capital felony-
Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana.18 ' After
the entire death penalty apparatus of North Car-
olina and Louisiana was declared unconstitutional
in Woodson v. North Carolina and Robert v. Louisiana,
the legislatures of those states enacted death pen-
alty statutes for crimes other than rape.'8 2 After
completing his survey, Justice White concluded
that "Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence
of death when the rape victim is an adult
woman."' 83 Since the legislative response to Furman
was a "marked indication of society's endorsement
of the death penalty for murder,"' 4 Justice White
concluded that the legislative failure to include
177 In terms of the order of the actual opinion, Justice
White addressed the death-for-rape question first and
then added that the additional circumstance did not
make a difference. I have reversed the order for discussion
because it appears to be analytically more sound to
address the individual circumstance before addressing
the broad question.
178 433 U.S. at 592.
'79 Id. at 593.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 594.
182 Id.
'8' Id. at 595-96.




death for rape was probative in determining that
death is an inappropriate penalty for rape.s
85
In addition to comparing the jurisdictional re-
sponse to Furman, Justice White canvassed the will-
ingness of Georgian juries to impose the death
penalty for a rape.ss8 According to the plurality
opinion, Georgiajuries returned the death sentence
in only six of the sixty-three rape cases reviewed by
the Georgia Supreme Court.1
8 7
Justice White viewed this fact as evidence that
juries, and therefore the community judgment,
viewed the death penalty as disproportionate for
rape. Finally, Justice White argued that the Court's
"own judgment" determined that the death pen-
alty was disproportionate for a rape conviction.'88
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion in which
he concurred in part and dissented in part.189 Jus-
tice Powell agreed with the plurality opinion that
the eighth amendment prohibited Coker's execu-
tion for the two aggravating circumstances present
in the case, (1) rape committed by someone with a
prior capital conviction, and (2) rape committed
while the offender was engaged in another capital
felony. Justice Powell disagreed, however, with the
Court's conclusion that the death penalty could
never be imposed for the third category-aggra-
vated or physically abusive rape. Justice Powell
argued that an "outrageous rape resulting in seri-
ous, lasting harm to the victim"' 0 could be consti-
tutionally punished by death. Justice Powell ex-
amined the character of the offense, but not the
character of the offender.
Chief Justice Burger, in a dissent joined by
Justice Rehnquist, took issue with the plurality's
decision to limit consideration of Coker's death
sentence to the rape charge rather than considering
rape plus aggravating circumstances.' 9' The Chief
Justice pointed to various recidivist statutes as
examples of enhanced punishment not directed
against the seriousness of an isolated offense but
directed against a "well-d, nonstrated propensity
for life endangering beha-ior."' 92 To the Chief
Justice the appropriate question was not whether
"LId. at 596.
'86 Id. at 596-97.
187 Id. There is no mention of the total number of rape
cases tried in the lower courts and not appealed to the
Supreme Court of Georgia, nor of the number of guilty
pleas tendered and thus without appeal.
' Id. at 597.
'9id. at 601.
'90 Id. at 604.
191 Id.
"92Id. at 610 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
183 n.28).
the state could execute an offender for a first-time
rape but
193
Does the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel
and unusual punishment prohibit the State of Geor-
gia from executing a person who has, within the
space of three years, raped three separate women,
killing one and attempting to kill another, who is
serving prison terms exceeding his probable life
time, and who has not hesitated to escape confine-
ment at the first available opportunity?
Next, the Chief Justice took issue with the rea-
soning used by the plurality in determining that
Georgia was the only American jurisdiction to
punish the rape of an adult woman with death. t 4
The Chief Justice argued that the pre-Furman cat-
alogue of states was a more accurate indicator of
societal attitudes toward the appropriate punish-
ment for rape than the frenzied post-Furman activ-
ity.' 9' Since at least two Justices in Furman ex-
pressed the opinion that mandatory penalties were
constitutionally appropriate, many legislatures be-
lieved their alternatives to be abolishing the death
penalty for rape or making it mandatory. Given
this choice, and the probable fact that most legis-
lators would not favor a mandatory death penalty
for all rapes, the reaction seems predictable.
Finally, the Chief Justice challenged the plural-
ity's judgment that the death penalty is dispropor-
tionate to the crime of rape. 1' He argued that rape
is, short of homicide, the ultimate violation of
self 197 and that there is no eighth amendment
requirement that a penalty be directly proportion-
ate to the crime. Therefore, the Chief Justice con-
cluded that a legislature might logically select a
penalty one step "more severe than the criminal
act it punishes."'9
HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTES IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
When England had over one hundred capital
offenses, recidivism was not a pressing concern
193 Id. at 607.
9 Id. at 614.
195 Justice White's use of jury verdicts also constitutes
an inappropriate indicator of sentiment regarding the
capital punishment. He noted that only six out of 63
juries provided for the death penalty for rape in Georgia.
Justice White takes this to mean that juries oppose the
death penalty for mere rape. While this is an accurate
inference, he overlooks an equally accurate inference that
juries do not find the death penalty excessive for aggra-
vated rape. 433 U.S. 596-97.
'1 Id. at 619.
a Id. at 620.
"'Id. at 619.
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because a single conviction frequently terminated
the offender's opportunities to commit crime. The
concept of habitual offender statutes in America,
however, is quite old. New York, for example, has
had an habitual offender statute since 1796.' 9'
Today, the vast majority of American jurisdictions
have some sort of enhanced punishment provision
for repeat offenders. These statutes often have been
criticized by legal commentators as too harsh, too
broad, or as failing in their essential purpose.2°°
However, as this section demonstrates, the habitual
offender laws have been generously received by the
Supreme Court. The numerous attacks on these
statutes include (1) due process, (2) equal protec-
tion, (3) cruel and unusual punishment, (4) the
procedure used in the enhancement of punishment,
and (5) the use of these statutes in plea bargaining.
Each attempt at the habitual offender statute has
failed in the Supreme Court.
The first appearance of an habitual offender
statute in the Supreme Court was in Moore v.
Missouri.20' In Moore, the defendant had been con-
victed of grand larceny in 1887 and served a three-
year sentence. After being released from the Mis-
souri penitentiary, Moore was convicted of bur-
glary in the second degree and sentenced to life
imprisonment under the Missouri habitual crimi-
nal statute. Moore argued that the statute violated
the constitutional provisions that prohibit double
jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishments and
guarantee equal protection of the laws.202 The
Moore Court clearly thought that the double jeop-
ardy argument was the most substantial one. The
Court determined that the punishment did not
result in a second punishment for the first offense
but resulted from an enhancement or aggravation
of the punishment for the second offense.2°s Along
with this holding the Court merely said that "the
increase of his punishment by reason of the com-
mission of the first offense was not cruel and unu-
sual. ' ' °
The above half-sentence addressing the cruel
and unusual punishment argument can be read as
stating that enhancement for a second offense does
not violate the eighth amendment. The sentence
need not be read as approving a life sentence under
the habitual offender law against a disproportion-
'9 See Note, Don't Steal a Turkey in Arkansas-The Second
Felgo Offender in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 76 (1976).
See, e.g., Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsid-
eration, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 99 (1971).
20' 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
2 Id. at 675-76.
"Id. at 677.
2 id.
ality attack. Despite this potential ambiguity, the
Court continued to give the cruel and unusual
punishment argument short shrift in the next two
attacks on habitual criminal statutes. In McDonald
v. Massachusetts,05 the defendant had been con-
victed under a Massachusetts habitual criminal
statute which mandated a twenty-five-year sen-
tence upon certain third convictions. 206 The de-
fendant's two prior convictions had been for per-
jury and obtaining property by false pretenses; the
third conviction was a four-count conviction for
forging and uttering money orders. The Supreme
Court summarily rejected McDonald's constitu-
tional arguments including one based on the eighth
amendment. °7
The procedure used by the State of West Vir-
205 180 U.S. 311.
2 The first two convictions had to have resulted in a
prison term of at least three years, and no pardon could
have been given for either of these two prior convictions.
180 U.S. at 311.
20'Id. at 313. While the Supreme Court's summary
treatment of the eighth amendment issues in Moore and
McDonald might logically leave open the possibility that
the Court had approved only the enhancement of a
penalty under the eighth amendment and not the specific
degree of enhancement, the Supreme Judicial Court's
treatment of McDonald's argument allows no such room
for misinterpretation:
The fifth assignment is to the effect that the punish-
ment provided by the statute is cruel and unusual
punishment, and is contrary to article 5 of the
amendments to the constitution of the United
States, and to article 26 of the declaration of
rights.... Ordinarily, the terms "cruel and unu-
sual" imply something inhuman and barbarous in
the nature of the punishment. In re Kemnler, supra.
But it is possible that imprisonment in the state
prison for a long term of years might be so dispro-
portionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and
unusual punishment. However, that may be, it can-
not be held, we think, that the punishment is "cruel
and unusual," where the statute provides, as it does
here [statute described]. The penalty was deter-
mined, no doubt, by the view that in such a case
the criminal habit has become so fixed and the hope
of reformation is so slight that the safety of society
requires and justifies a long-continued imprison-
ment of the offender. The statute provides, however,
that if it appears to the governor and council at any
time that the convict has reformed, they may release
him conditionally for the residue of the term.
173 Mass. at 328-29, 53 N.E. at 875. This state court
opinion is important for two reasons: First, it was the first
state court decision to unambiguously admit that a sen-
tence can be disproportionate under the eighth amend-
ment merely because of length; and second, for purposes
of the court's analysis, the court was willing to mitigate




ginia to enhance punishment under its habitual
criminal statute was the primary issue in Graham v.
West Virginia.2 s In Graham, the defendant had been
convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to five
years imprisonment. While in prison, the prosecut-
ing attorney brought an information against Gra-
ham alleging that he had been convicted of two
prior felonies: grand larceny and burglary. In a
separate proceeding, Graham's punishment was
enhanced to life imprisonment. The Supreme
Court upheld this separate enhancement procedure
against constitutional attacks. For the third time
the Supreme Court summarily rejected an eighth
amendment argument.
The West Virginia habitual criminal act made
its second appearance in the Supreme Court in
Oyler v. Boles.29 The essential argument in Oyler
was that the prosecuting authorities, by selective
use of the enhancement statute, were denying the
petitioners equal protection of the law. The peti-
tioners could show statistically that not all defend-
ants liable for the enhanced punishment were
charged with a recidivist count. 21 0 The Supreme
Court held that selective enforcement of the statute
did not deny equal protection so long as the selec-
tion was not "deliberately based upon an unjusti-
fiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification. 2 1 '
In 1967 the Texas recidivist procedure came
before the Supreme Court in Spencer v. Texas. 2 For
years Texas juries knew that the defendant had
prior convictions before the jury determined the
defendant's innocence or guilt.21 3 This procedure
was narrowly upheld by the Court, but in the
course of the opinion the Court gave this extraor-
dinary broad approval to habitual criminal stat-
utes:
No claim is made here that recidivist statutes are
themselves unconstitutional, nor could there be un-
der our cases. Such statutes and other enhanced-
sentence laws, and procedures designed to imple-
28224 U.S. 616 (1912).
m 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
210 Id. at 455. The opinion does not give the precise
statistic. It states: "The statistics merely show that ac-
cording to penitentiary records a high percentage of those
subject to the law have not been proceeded against." Id.
at 456.
211 Id. at 456. Four Justices, Warren, Douglas, Black,
and Brennan, dissented on an unrelated point concerning
the notice given a defendant under the habitual offender
proceeding. Id. at 460.
212 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
213 Id. at 556. The procedure has since changed. Id. at
556-57 n.2.
ment their underlying policies, have been enacted
in all the States, and by the Federal Government as
well.... Such statutes, though not in the precise
procedural circumstances here involved, have been
sustained in this Court on several occasions against
contentions that they violate constitutional stric-
tures dealing with double jeopardy, ex post facto laws,
cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal
protection, and privileges and immunities.214
A recent Supreme Court consideration of habit-
ual criminal statutes involved the use of these
statutes in plea bargaining. In Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,215 the defendant was indicted on a charge of
uttering a forged instrument. During plea bargain-
ing the defendant was offered a five-year prison
term out of a possible ten years, if he would plead
guilty to the charge. The prosecutor also told the
defendant either to accept this plea offer or the
prosecutor would return to the grand jury and seek
an indictment under the Kentucky habitual crim-
inal act. The defendant refused the offer and the
prosecutor obtained the habitual criminal indict-
ment 'After conviction on the substantive count
and a finding that the defendant had been con-
,icted twice before, he received a mandatory life
sentence. The Supreme Court approved this use of
the habitual criminal statute to induce plea bar-
gaining, calling the prosecutor's behavior merely
the "unpleasant alternative of forgoing trial or





Four Justices dissented in Bordenkircher. Three
Justices characterized the prosecutor's action as
impermissibly "vindictive., 2 17 Justice Powell char-
acterized the plea bargain offer as less than "gen-
erous"
21 8 
and thought it relevant to ask "whether
the prosecutor reasonably might have charged re-
spondent under the Habitual Criminal Act in the
first place., 219 Apparently, Justice Powell, in some
circumstances, is willing to weigh the reasonable-
ness of the prosecutor's exercise of discretion to seek
a habitual criminal indictment, despite the holding
of Oyler v. Boles. Because Justice Powell viewed this
particular use of the habitual criminal act as un-
reasonable, he concluded that the prosecutor could
only have meant "to deter the exercise of consti-
tutional rights." 2 ° Although not explicit in the
214 Id. at 559-60 (citations omitted).
2'5 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
2 16 Id. at 365.
217 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 369 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21 9Id. at 370.
22°Id. at 373.
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opinion, one can infer that Justice Powell thought
the application of the habitual criminal act dispro-
portionate.
The habitual criminal cases make clear that in
this area, unlike the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has shown no special solicitude for the eighth
amendment argument.
THE DISPROPORTIONALITY ARGUMENT IN THE
LOWER COURTS
The disproportionality argument has been made
in almost every American jurisdiction and has been
met with near universal hostility. Only a few ex-
ceptional cases have interdicted prison sentences as
impermissibly long under the eighth amendment,
and a few cases have interfered with prison sen-
tences under a theory akin to the disproportionality
argument.
This section examines several early cases often
called the first disproportionality cases. It will dem-
onstrate that factors other than the proportionality
argument influenced these cases. Next, it examines
the handful of states that have accepted the pro-
portionality argument and have actually found a
prison term excessively long under the eighth
amendment. The state experience under the dis-
proportionality theory will then be examined. Fi-
nally, it analyzes contemporary developments in
the federal courts under the proportionality argu-
ment.
EARLY CASES
State v. DriverHS is frequently cited as the first
instance of a court rejecting a prison sentence under
a proportionality concept. Driver was convicted of
the common law crime' of wifebeating and sen-
tenced to five years in the county jail and was
required to post a $500 peace bond. The North
Carolina Supreme Court found Driver's punish-
ment excessive because his sentence was "greater
than has ever been prescribed or known"23 and
therefore must be "excessive, cruel and unusual"'
in violation of the North Carolina Constitution.=5
While one reading of Driver supports the propor-
tionality Loncept, a different meaning becomes
2' 78 N.C. 423 (1878).
2 An immediate distinction between State v. Driver
and the present consideration of the proportionality ar-
gument is the fact that there was no legislatively selected
punishment involved in Driver, since the defendant was
convicted of a common law crime.
22 78 N.C. at 426.
2U id.
m The text is identical to the eighth amendment.
apparent when Driver is read in conjunction with
a prior North Carolina case. In State v. Miller,22 6 the
defendant had been convicted of assault with in-
tent to kill and was sentenced to the county jail for
five years. Miller argued that the five-year sentence
was unconstitutionally excessive. Although the
court reversed on other grounds, it did elaborate
on the proportionality issue. In dicta the court
remarked that "[I]n our case his Honor imprisoned
the defendant for five years, not in the penitentiary,
where one may live so long, but in the county jail,
where it is strongly probable that confinement ...
would cause a lingering death.
2 2 7
Read in conjunction with Miller, State v. Driver is
logically explained as a condition of confinement
case and not a proportionality case addressing only
the length of punishment. This conclusion is but-
tressed by later cases from the North Carolina
Supreme Court flatly refusing to recognize any
power under the eighth amendment or the state
constitution to review the lengths of prison sen-
tences.=
Another early case frequently thought to support
the proportionality concept is also inapposite. In
State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker,' 9 three defendants
were convicted in municipal court of seventy-two
counts of destroying plants in a New Orleans public
square. The trial judge sentenced the defendants
to pay a $10 fine for each offense or in lieu of the
$720 fine serve thirty days for each offense, about
six years total. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that any punishment in excess of a $25 fine or
alternative imprisonment in excess of thirty days
violated the state's constitution30 because the con-
stitutional limits of punishment were coterminous
with the jurisdictional limit of the municipal court.
Viewed in this light, Garvey merely establishes the
jurisdictional limits of the municipal court. At
present, the Louisiana Supreme Court accepts the
proportionality concept, but it has never reduced
a sentence under this theory.
2 31
226 75 N.C. 73 (1876).
27Id. at 77.
n8 State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 281, 252 S.E.2d 717 (1979)
(life for burglary); State v. Whaley, 263 N.C. 824, 140
S.E.2d 305 (1965) (20 years for breaking and entering
and larceny); State v. Stansbury, 230 N.C. 589,55 S.E.2d
185 (1949) (five to six years for fraudulently obtaining
$15.90).
48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896).
2' Same text as the eighth amendment.
21 State v. Sykes, 364 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1978) (man-
datory life penalty for distribution of heroin upheld);
State v. Terrebonne, 364 So. 2d 1290 (La. 1978) (same);
State v. Mallery, 364 So. 2d 1283 (La. 1978) (same).
1980]
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A third case erroneously believed to support the
proportionality concept is Calhoun v. State.2 32 In
Calhoun, a black man had been convicted of raping
a white woman "who associated mainly with ...
negroes" and was sentenced to death. In revers-
ing the conviction and ordering a new trial, the
court said that the evidence was not sufficient for
conviction and the emotions of the jury may have
constituted the deciding factor.
On petition for rehearing the state argued that
it had presented all the evidence it could and asked
the court to either hold that the evidence was
insufficient or affirm the death penalty. 2- In over-
ruling the motion for rehearing, the court men-
tioned the state's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments for the first time2 36 and rea-
soned that since the court has the power to rule on
the sufficiency of the evidence, it must also have
the power to assess the appropriateness of the
punishment selected. 2 7 The incredible nature of
the Calhoun case can hardly support the proposition
that Calhoun has a place in the orderly development
Interestingly, the Louisiana legislature has now made the
penalty for distribution of heroin a life sentence "without
benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." 1977 La.
Acts 631. See also State v. Kemp, 359 So. 2d 978 (La.
1978) (15 years without parole for armed robbery); State
v. Brooks, 350 So. 2d 1174 (La. 1977) (life without parole
for second degree murder).
232 214 S.W. 335 (Tex. Crim. 1919).
2 Id.
2m Id. at 336.
It is truly remarkable that a woman physically
strong, weighing 120 pounds, and knowing herself
to be in such easy calling distance of so many
people, in the daytime, without apparently any
tears or excitement, could be raped by a negro.
Appellant was without money or friends, and the
trial court appointed counsel to defend him. He was
given the death sentence, and the case had been
pending in this court many months when the writer
of the opinion came upon the bench. We have
carefully considered the record in all its different
aspects. We are fully aware of the feeling that exists
in the breast of every white man for the sanctity of
the home, and the virtue of woman, when he hears
that a black man is charged with an offense of this
character against a white woman. We believe that
grave care should be exercised in such a case lest
the judgment be swayed by passion. The character
of prosecutrix, the peculiar circumstances surround-
ing the case, the severity of the penalty, are matters
that appeal to us with such force as to cause us to




of the proportionality concept.m Indeed, the Texas
courts disavow any power under the eighth amend-
ment to review the length of prison sentences.
239
STATE EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROPORTIONALITY
ARGUMENT
South Carolina
For many years South Carolina accepted the
traditional view that there was no power to inter-
fere with a legislatively selected punishment.A0 In
1947, two dissenting judges in State v. Brandon24 1
were willing to hold that an eighteen-month sen-
tence, half-suspended, for unlawful possession of
liquor in a place of business constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. A year later in State v. Kim-
brough,24 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court be-
came the first court to unambiguously hold that a
sentence within the legislatively set limit consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment solely because
of the sentence's excessive length.4
m_ Shortly after Calhoun, another black defendant was
sentenced to death for the murder of a white storekeeper.
The storekeeper had obviously provoked the assault by
beating the black with a stick. In affirming the conviction
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Foley v.
State, 272 S.W. 799, 800 (rex. Crim. 1925): "The evi-
dence in the case is not such as would ordinarily lead one
to expect a verdict assessing the death penalty. Possibly
the fact that the appellant was a negro and the deceased
a white man may have had some bearing." On petition
for rehearing the court reviewed the testimony offered at
trial and concluded that the conviction should be re-
versed on the authority of Calhoun because the "verdict
does not reflect a fair, calm, deliberate judgment on the
facts." Id. at 802. Later in Burrows v. State, 140 Tex.
Crim. 22, 143 S.W.2d 609, 611 (1940), the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals described Calhoun as "more on ac-
count of the unsatisfactory condition of the facts rather
than the excessiveness of the verdict." Calhoun's last ap-
pearance in the Texas Court of Appeals was in an
individual opinion of one judge of that court in Purcell
v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 565, 322 S.W.2d 268, 279 (1959).
239 See cases noted in Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651,
654 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
240 See Davis v. State, 88 S.C. 229, 79 S.E. 811, 813
(1911).
241 43 S.E.2d 449, 451 (S.C. 1947) (Baker, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
2246 S.E.2d 273 (S.C. 1948).
213 In Kimbrough the defendant was convicted of a
burglary in which he stole a watch and chain. South
Carolina law provided for a life sentence upon conviction
of a burglary, or a penalty of not less than five years if
the jury recommends mercy. The jury recommended
mercy and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to
thirty years imprisonment. The court could have found
that the thirty-year sentence violated the spirit of the
mercy recommendation but the court chose to review the
sentence under the cruel and unusual punishment rubric.
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Following Kimbrough, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court never again interfered with a prison
sentence under the disproportionality principle.
Among the sentences upheld were twenty-five years
for armed robbery, ' nine years and six months for
grand larceny,24 both eighteen-month and two-
year sentences for possession and manufacture of
alcoholic liquors,24 six years for housebreaking,
2 7
death for rape,2 s five years for distributing one-
seventh of an ounce of marijuana, 2 9 and ten years
for safecracking.250
In 1975, the South Carolina Supreme Court
considered a proportionality attack made by a
twenty-year-old defendant convicted of distribut-
ing one-seventh of an ounce of marijuana and
sentenced to five years in prison.2st Over the dissent
of a single justice, the court made no mention of
the disproportionality analysis and stated, "We
have held that this Court has no jurisdiction to
disturb, because of alleged excessiveness, a sentence




Two years later in Stockton v. Leeke,20 the South
Carolina Supreme Court returned to dispropor-
tionality analysis in upholding a ten-year zs sen-
tence for safecracking. The court explained that
safecracking carries a greater minimum penalty
than many violent crimes because safecracking is
a crime that demonstrates great deliberation.255
The court reasoned that since the jury had recommended
mercy and the burglary was not accompanied by any
aggravating factors, the thirty-year sentence constituted
a tyrannical punishment. Id. at 277.
244 State v. Scates, 46 S.E.2d 693 (S.C. 1948).
24s State v. Hurt, 48 S.E.2d 313, 321 (S.C. 1948).
26 State v. Hall, 80 S.E.2d 239 (S.C. 1954) (two years
upheld); State v. Goodall, 69 S.E.2d 915 (S.C. 1952) (18
months upheld; two judges dissented on authority of
Kimbrough); State v. Phillips, 54 S.E.2d 901 (S.C. 1949)
(two years upheld); State v. Bell, 54 S.E.2d 900, 901 (S.C.
1948) (18 months upheld for defendant who had been in
the illegal business for 20 years).
2'7 State v. Alexander, 95 S.E.2d 160 (S.C. 1956).
248 State v. Gamble, 155 S.E.2d 916 (S.C. 1967).
249 State v. Queen, 216 S.E.2d 182 (S.C. 1975).
= Stockton v. Leeke, 237 S.E.2d 896 (S.C. 1977).
251 State v. Queen, 216 S.E.2d 182. See also Queen v.
Leeke, 457 F. Supp. 476 (D.S.C.), appeal dism'd, 584 F.2d
977 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding sentence).
2,52 16 S.E.2d at 185.
2s3 237 S.E.2d 896.
25' The ten-year sentence is the minimum sentence
provided by South Carolina law.
255 237 S.E.2d at 898. The court also stated that safe-
cracking was a more serious crime than petty theft be-
cause one who steals the contents of a safe is more likely
to pose a greater threat to society than the petty thief.
Michigan
For many years Michigan followed the tradi-
tional view that a sentence within the statutory
limit was immune from attack.25 However, People
v. Lorentzen2"7 represents a plain example of a court
finding a legislatively mandated sentence uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate.25 The Michigan Su-
preme Court determined that the mandatory mini-
mum term for sale of marijuana offended the
Michigan and federal prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishments. 2 9 The court observed
that the mandatory minimum was greater than the
penalty for sale of marijuana in most other states26°
and greater than the penalty imposed by Michigan
for many other felonies. 261 Finally, the court noted
that after Lorentzen's conviction the Michigan
legislature drastically reduced the penalty for sale
of marijuana.
262
The Lorentzen opinion is not a model of clarity.
263
In one portion of the opinion the court clearly
states that the mandatory twenty-year penalty is
itself unconstitutional. 264 But in another part of the
2' The Michigan Supreme Court cited thirteen cases
for this proposition. People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167,
173-74, 194 N.W.2d 827, 830 (1972).
57 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827.
2" Id, at 178, 194 N.W.2d at 833. In Lorentzen the
defendant was sentenced under a Michigan statute which
required a minimum sentence of twenty years for sale of
marijuana. Id. at 176, 194 N.W.2d at 831.
25 Id. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 837.26 0 1d at 179, 194 N.W.2d at 832.
261 Id.
262 The court gave no effect to the provision of this law
calling for a review of all sentences under the old law.
263 In People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d
878 (1972), a companion case to Lorentzen, the Michigan
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a nine-
and-one-half-year sentence for possession of marijuana.
In a bizarre set of opinions, two judges of the Michigan
Supreme Court held that categorizing marijuana as a
narcotic violated equal protection; two judges held that
the defendant was entrapped; two judges held that the
nine-and-one-half-year minimum sentence was unconsti-
tutionally harsh; and one judge held that the law pro-
hibiting possession of marijuana violated "fundamental
rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as ex-
plained by John S. Mill in his On Liberty.
Given the two ambiguous cases in the Michigan Su-
preme Court, it immediately split the lower Michigan
courts until the Michigan Supreme Court summarily
adopted the view that the marijuana statute was uncon-
stitutional on the questions of possession or attempted
possession. Compare People v. Griffin, 39 Mich. App. 464,
198 N.W.2d 21 (1972), with People v. Waxman, 41 Mich.
App. 277, 199 N.W.2d 884, leave granted with summary
reversal, 388 Mich. 744, 200 N.W.2d 322 (1972).
264 387 Mich. at 178, 194 N.W.2d at 832.
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opinion the court states that the compulsory
twenty-year penalty imposed on Eric Lorentzen
was unconstitutionally excessive because of the
defendant's individual personality and history.e
Furthermore, portions of the Lorentzen opinion ap-
parently express opinions on cases far beyond the
immediate case of marijuana possession. For ex-
ample, one passage of the court's opinion might be
read as requiring that all criminal sentences, save
those for very serious crimes, be for less than five
years.26 Another passage of the opinion might be
read as striking down all long mandatory penalties
for nonviolent offenses.
2 67
Despite the apparent holding of Lorentzen that a
mandatory penalty of twenty years for a nonviolent
offense was unconstitutional, the lower Michigan
courts were unanimous in refusing to strike down
long sentences for other than marijuana offenses. 268
26id.
26 Id. The court cited three law review articles for this
proposition, without further explanation. "Experts on
penology and criminal corrections tend to be of the
opinion that, except for extremely serious crimes or un-
usually disturbed persons, the goal of rehabilitating of-
fenders with maximum effectiveness can best be reached
by short sentences of less than five years imprisonment."
Id.
267 "A compulsory prison sentence of twenty years for
a nonviolent crime imposed without consideration for
defendant's individual personality and history is so ex-
cessive that it 'shocks the conscience."' Id. at 181, 194
N.W.2d at 834.
26 In People v. Osteen, 46 Mich. App. 409, 208
N.W.2d 198 (1973), a Michigan appellate court upheld
a 20- to 25-year sentence for a $20 sale of heroin. The
court explained Lorentzen as not extending to heroin. Id.
at 416, 208 N.W.2d at 201. In People v. Bersine, 48 Mich.
App. 295, 210 N.W.2d 501 (1973), the same court upheld
a 20- to 30-year sentence for a $10 sale of heroin.
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the lower
court's reading of Lorentzen in People v. Stewart, 400
Mich. 540, 256 N.W.2d 31 (1977). In Stewart the court
upheld the mandatory 20-year minimum for sale of
heroin with the statement, "We are not prepared to
extend our holding in Lorentzen to heroin." Id. at 554, 265
N.W.2d at 36. In Stewart, Justice Kavanagh did not
explain why sale of heroin was not protected under the
pursuit of happiness theory announced in his opinions in
Sinclair and Lorentzen.
The proportionality argument met with similar hostil-
ity in other areas. In People v. Bullock, 48 Mich. App.
700, 211 N.W.2d 108 (1973), a Michigan appellate court
upheld a three-and-one-half to four-year sentence for the
theft of four sirloin steaks against proportionality attack.
The same court upheld a statute that provided for up to
a life sentence for "bank, safe and vault robbery" in
People v. Ferguson, 60 Mich App. 302, 230 N.W.2d 406
(1975). Another Michigan court upheld a mandatory life
sentence for first degree felony murder against a propor-
tionality attack in People v. Moore, 51 Mich. App. 48,
Calirnia
For many years California had an unusual sn-
tencing system. For many crimes the punishment
upon conviction was a sentence of "not less than
one year." 269 For other crimes, the sentence was
indeterminate within a broad range. For example,
the punishment for assault with intent to commit
murder was imprisonment from one to fourteen
years.
°
Superimposed on the indeterminate sentencing
scheme were various provisions of the California
Code which denied parole for a selected period of
time. For example, a second offender guilty of
furnishing heroin would be sentenced to an inde-
terminate ten years to life, and in addition, would
not be eligible for parole until ten years of the
sentence was served.'
The California Supreme Court has adopted pro-
portionality analysis to test the various provisions
against the strictures outlawing cruel and unusual
punishment. The California courts have developed
three distinct doctrines. The first doctrine tests the
indeterminate sentence gauged by the maximum
sentence permitted by the statute.2 72 The second
doctrine tests the sentences hierarchically. Because
of the unusual sentencing scheme, it was sometimes
possible for a defendant to be acquitted of a major
offense which carried a maximum term of years
but be convicted of a lesser included offense that
carried an indeterminate lifetime sentence.2 3 The
214 N.W.2d 548 (1974). Finally, the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld a 50- to 80-year sentence for second degree
murder in People v. Burton, 396 Mich. 238, 240 N.W.2d
239 (1976), with the statements, "We appreciate that a
strong case can be made for appellate review of sentenc-
ing. This court is not, however, yet prepared to take that
step." Id. at 243, 240 N.W.2d at 242. "People v. Loren-
tzen ... relied on by Burton, is not in point." Id. at 243
n.10, 240 N.W.2d at 242 n.10.
269 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1954) (sec-
ond conviction for indecent exposure).
270 CAL. PENAL CODE § 217 (West 1954). For a table
of various California penalities, see People v. Smith, 42
Cal. App. 3d 706, 710 n.2, 117 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 n.2
(1974).
271 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1954).
2 1 See In re Lynch where the California Supreme Court
assumed that the indeterminate sentence imposed for a
second offense of indecent exposure was a sentence for
life imprisonment and that sentence was unconstitution-
ally harsh. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 419, 503 P.2d 921, 926, 105
Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (1973).272 See, e.g., People v. Schuren, where the defendant
was acquitted of the charge of assault with intent to
murder, but convicted of the "lesser and necessarily
included offense" of assault with a deadly weapon. The
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third doctrine tests the legality of the "no parole"
provision apart from the constitutionality of the
underlying sentence.2 74 In the following sections,
the California cases under the three doctrines are
examined.
For many years California followed the tradi-
tional view that a sentence within the legislatively
selected range did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment because of its length. In Ex Parte Ro-
sencrantz275 the California Supreme Court upheld a
mandatory life sentence, without the possibility of
parole, that had been imposed on a woman con-
victed of passing fictitious checks on four occasions.
The California view changed dramatically in In re
Lynch.
276
California punishes first offense indecent expo-
sure as a simple misdemeanor. The second offense,
however, is a felony carrying an indeterminate
sentence of "not less than one year."2 7 In Lynch, a
second offender under this statute argued that his
sentence was unconstitutionally excessive. While
the Lynch opinion is not the first proportionality
case, it is the first case to develop a series of working
propositions to test for a sentence's excessiveness.
First, the court examined the nature of the offense
and the offender with particular regard to the
degree of danger each presents to society.27 8 Second,
the Lynch court compared the punishments im-
posed in California for more serious offenses than
principal, charge carried a maximum term of fourteen
years while the lesser charge carried the lifetime indeter-
minate sentence. In Schuren, the California Supreme
Court ruled that any sentence in excess of the 14-year
maximum sentence constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 10 Cal. 3d 553, 516 P.2d 833, 111 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1974). For a comprehensive treatment of the dupli-
cative statute problem, see Comment, Duplicative Statutes,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Illinois Anned Violence Statute,
71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 226 (1980).
274 For example, in In re Ross, the California Supreme
Court upheld the ten-year to life sentence for distributing
heroin but struck down the provision that precluded
parole for ten years. 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112
Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).275 205 Cal. 534, 271 P. 902 (1928).
2768 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217.
M' The law is easily explained in historic terms. During
the 1940s California was shocked when a minor sex
offender committed a horrible murder. See People v.
Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951), af'd, 343
U.S. 181 (1952). Thereafter public outcry caused Gover-
nor Earl Warren to convene an extraordinary session of
the legislature to enact tough sex offender legislation. See
In re Wells, 46 Cal. App. 3d 592, 598, 121 Cal. Rptr. 23,
2741975).8 8 Cal. 3d at 425, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
226.
the questioned offense.279 Last, the court compared
the challenged penalty with punishments pre-
scribed in other jurisdictions for the same
offense.80
The reaction to Lynch by the lower California
appellate courts was less than consistent despite the
efforts of the Lynch court to establish a set of
predictable standards.
281
279 Id. at 426, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227.2w Id. at 427, 503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
Since the Lynch court decided to gauge the penalty by
the maximum penalty possible under the indeterminate
sentencing law, it is not surprising that in his comparison,
California had many prisoners serving life sentences for
offenses that normally did not carry a life sentence in
states with a more determinate sentencing scheme.
"si Over a dissent, one California appellate court up-
held a five-year to life sentence for sale of marijuana in
In re Jones, 35 Cal. App. 3d 531, 110 Cal. Rptr. 765
(1973). In People v. Smith, 42 Cal. App. 3d 706, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1974), a prison sentence up to a maximum of
ten years was upheld for the theft of $22.40 and a bus
pass. Similarly, the same sentence was upheld for the
theft of two newborn calves in People v. Thomas, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 862, 118 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1974). In People v.
Adams, 43 Cal. App. 3d 697, 117 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1974),
a ten-year sentence was upheld for receiving $26.27 worth
of stolen property.
A life sentence without the possibility of parole for
kidnapping was upheld in In re Maston, 33 Cal. App. 3d
559, 109 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1973) and People v. Isitt, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 23, 127 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976). The defendant in
Isitt was seventeen years old at the time of the offense.
Other sentences for violent crimes were upheld by the
California appellate courts. In People v. Wilson, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 123 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1975), an indeterminate
sentence of five to twenty years was upheld for attempt
to commit second degree robbery and assault with intent
to commit robbery. In People v. Morgan, 36 Cal. App.
3d 444, 111 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1973), an indeterminate ten
years to life sentence was upheld for robbery using a
firearm. In People v. Kingston, 44 Cal. App. 3d 629, 118
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1974), the statutory sentence of one year
to life imprisonment for statutory rape was upheld
against a defendant who had consensual sexual inter-
course with a thirteen-year-old child. Finally, in People
v. Wingo, 38 Cal. App. 3d 895, 113 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1974),
vacated, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1975), a California appellate court upheld a six-month
to life sentence for assault by means likely to cause bodily
harm.
While a broad range of sentences were upheld under
the Lynch rationale by the California appellate courts,
some courts also struck penalities down. In People v.
Romo, 39 Cal. App. 3d 326, 114 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1974),
vacated, 14 Cal. 3d 189, 534 P.2d 1015, 121 Cal. Rptr. 111
(1975), an appellate court struck down an indeterminate
sentence of six months to life for assault with a deadly
weapon as disproportionately harsh. Another district of
the California Court of Appeals reached the same con-
clusion in People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 3d 861, 116
Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974).
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The operating assumption of Lynch is that the
severity of the sentence should be gauged by the
maximum possible sentence.28 2 In two cases the
California Supreme Court severely limited the ef-
fect of this operating assumption. In vacating the
appellate court determinations in Wingo2'3 and
Romo, 2 4 the California Supreme Coirt held that
challenges under the disproportionality concept
would be premature until the California adult
authority set a date certain maximum term. Under
the Wingo regime, the flood of proportionality cases
ceased except for rare cases like In re Rodriguez2ss in
which the California Supreme Court ordered a
defendant released after serving twenty-two years
for lewd and lascivious acts on a child.
The second proportionality doctrine is repre-
sented by People v. Schueren2s6 in which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the punishment for
a lesser included offense could not constitutionally
exceed the punishment provided for the greater
principal offense. Although this is an unusual fac-
tual situation, there are similar cases from other
jurisdictions.28 7
In In re Wells, 46 Cal. App. 3d 592, 121 Cal. Rptr. 23,
an indeterminate life sentence was found unconstitu-
tional for second offense child molestation. Finally, in
People v. Keogh, 46 Cal. App. 3d 919, 120 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1975), four consecutive fourteen-year sentences for
forgery were struck down as disproportionate.
As the review of the intermediate California appellate
cases amply demonstrates, the lower court reaction to
Lynch was anything but harmonious. Certainly Wingo,
which upheld a life sentence for assault by means of force,
could not be squared with Thomas and Romo, which struck
down the indeterminate life sentence for assault with a
deadly weapon.
m For a criticism of this standard, see People v.
Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 3d 861, 116 Cal. Rptr. 393, 404
(Gardner, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
and Note, Indeterminate Sentence as Cruel or Unusual Punish-
ment, 61 CALIF. L. Rev. 418, 422 (1973). The question of
considering parole is considered in greater detail in the
text accompanying notes 468-98 infra.
M 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97.
28' 14 Cal. 3d 189, 534 P.2d 1015, 121 Cal. Rptr. 111.
285 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1975).
286 10 Cal. 3d 553, 516 P.2d 833, 111 Cal. Rptr. 129.
287 For California, see People v. Draper, 29 Cal. App.
3d 465, 105 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1972). For Oregon, see State
v. Ross, 55 Or. 450, 106 P. 1022 (1910) (fine imposed on
individual of S576,853.74 held excessive); Application of
Cannon, 203 Or. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955) (en banc)
(greater sentence on lesser included offense than possible
for the greater offense unconstitutional). For Indiana, see
also Dembrowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 240 N.E.2d 815
(1968) (same as Cannon). Also see, e.g., Robert v. Collins,
544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976) (same as Cannon).
Despite its insistence that an indeterminate sen-
tence for life should be considered one for natural
life, the California Supreme Court realistically con-
sidered that a restrictive parole date constituted a
separate element apart from the underlying sen-
tence in its third proportionality doctrine. In In re
Foss2' 88 the defendant was sentenced to ten years to
life imprisonment for furnishing heroin. An addi-
tional provision of his sentence precluded parole
for ten years. Without disturbing his life sentence
the California Supreme Court determined under
the Lynch factors that the parole limitation consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment." s
The reaction of the California appellate courts
to Foss was no more consistent than the reaction to
28 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649.
2 It would be an inacccurate statement to say that
the California Supreme Court in Foss struck down parole
preclusion in all cases. More precisely, the court described
its holding as
precluding parole consideration for a minimum pe-
riod of ten years imposed upon an offender with a
prior drug conviction, without regard to the exis-
tence of such possible mitigating circumstances as
the addict status of the offender, the quantity of
narcotics involved, the nature of the purchaser, or
the purposes of the sale, is [a] ... violation of... the
California Constitution.
Id. at 929, 519 P.2d at 1085, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
Interestingly, the California Supreme Court read the
Michigan Supreme Court's People v. Lorentzen, 387
Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827, far more broadly than the
Michigan Supreme Court did in People v. Stewart, 400
Mich. 540, 356 N.W.2d 31.
Earlier in this article, it was pointed out that the
Lorentzen opinion contained passages much broader than
the question presented in the Lorentzen case. In Lorentzen,
the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "A compulsory
prison sentence of twenty years for a non-violent crime
imposed without consideration for defendant's individual
personality and history is so excessive that it 'shocks the
conscience.' " 387 Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834.
The California Supreme Court added: "The provision
precluding consideration for parole for the minimum
term of ten years without consideration for either the
offender or his offense is no less shocking." 10 Cal. 3d at
923, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
Another passage of Lorentzen adds: "Experts on penol-
ogy and criminal corrections tend to be of the opinion
that, except for extremely serious crimes or unusually
disturbed persons, the goal of rehabilitating offenders
with maximum effectiveness can best be reached by short
sentences of less than five years imprisonment." 387
Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 833.
The California Supreme Court held: "Thus, where
rehabilitation of the offender is of primary importance,
the mandatory provision precluding parole consideration
for the ten-year minimum period as provided by section
11501 is clearly excessive." 10 Cal. 3d at 924, 519 P.2d at
1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
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Lynch.29 The California Supreme Court followed
with another case. In In re GrantP' the defendant
was convicted of the sale of marijuana. He had
twice before been convicted of narcotics violations
and was sentenced to serve ten years to life without
possibility of parole for ten years. Instead of review-
ing the particularized sentence charged to Grant,
the court reviewed the "entire scheme of... pre-
cluding parole consideration for recidivist narcotic
offenders."2' The court then determined that the
California provisions which preclude parole consid-
erations for a minimum of five or more years for
recidivist narcotic offenders constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.2s
29°The intermediate appellate courts applied the
Lynch/Foss criterion to a variety of situations.
In People v. Serna, 44 Cal. App. 3d 717, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1975), a California appellate court upheld a
three-year parole limitation imposed on a defendant for
sale of heroin. The same limitation was upheld in People
v. Waters, 52 Cal. App. 3d 323, 125 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1975),
for sale of and conspiracy to sell amphetamines. In In re
Heredia, 52 Cal. App. 3d 785, 125 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1975),
a six-year preclusion of parole was upheld for possession
of heroin for sale.
In People v. Carbonic, 48 Cal. App. 3d 679, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1975), a five-year parole preclusion was upheld
for a first offender who was convicted of using a minor to
furnish a non-narcotic controlled substance. Finally, in
In re Flores, 58 Cal. App. 3d 222, 128 Cal. Rptr. 847
(1976), a ten-year parole preclusion was upheld for con-
viction for sale of heroin to a minor.
In People v. Vargos, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1975), a California appellate court disagreed
with the Sema and Waters result and struck down a three-
year parole preclusion on a defendant who had been
convicted of furnishing a dangerous drug. In People v.
Thomas, 45 Cal. App. 3d 749, 119 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1975),
a~ fifteen-year parole preclusion was found to be uncon-
stitutionally harsh for a defendant who had been con-
victed of possession of heroin and had two prior drug
convictions. Five-year parole preclusions were struck
down as unconstitutionally harsh in People v. Malloy, 41
Cal. App. 3d 944, 116 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1974) (for second
offense sale of LSD); People v. Ruiz, 49 Cal. App. 3d
739, 122 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975) (for possession of mari-
juana by a defendant with two other narcotic offenses),
and In re Carter, 125 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1975).
2' 18 Cal. 3d 1, 553 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430
(1976).
24 Id. at 7, 553 P.2d at 594, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
m Interestingly, the court's opinion in Grant was joined
by three justices of the California Supreme Court. Fourjustices, in concurring and dissenting opinions, purported
not to decide the broad issue reached by the court. Id. at
18, 553 P.2d at 602, 132 Cal Rptr. at 442 (Sullivan, J.,
joined by McComb and Richardson, JJ., concurring and
dissenting, and Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
The lack of a clear majority opinion did not go unno-
ticed by the lower California appellate courts. In In re
Williams, 69 Cal. App.'3d 840, 138 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1977),
a California appellate court considered the question of
Kentucky
In Workman v. Commonwealth' the Kentucky
Court of Appeals determined that a life sentence
without the possibility of parole imposed on two
fourteen-year-old boys for the rape of a seventy-
one-year-old woman constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Three years later the same punish-
ment imposed on a sixteen-year-old also was found
to violate constitutional guarantees in Anderson v.
Commonwealth.29 5
In 1972, two defendants aged eighteen and
twenty-four argued that a life sentence without
parole for rape also constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. In the eighteen-year-old's case2 the
entire court's opinion on the cruel and unusual
punishment argument was that "We are not per-
suaded that the decision in Workman v. Common-
wealth... , that life imprisonment without parole
in the case of a juvenile constitutes 'cruel and
unusual punishment' should be extended to this
case. 29 7 In the twenty-four-year-old's case, the
same conclusion was stated.2 Finally, in Fryrear v.
Commonwealth29 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
stated that the operating distinction in these cases
was the fact that Workman and Anderson involved
juvenile offenders.s°
THE DISPROPORTIONALITY ARGUMENT IN THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS
For reasons suggested earlier in this article, the
proportionality doctrine in Weems v. United States
did not take hold. By 1952, the Second Circuit
stated in the famous Rosenberg case,9 1 "If there is
the constitutionality of a five-year parole preclusion to
be an open question for a defendant who had been
convicted of a second narcotics offense.
California adopted a determinate sentencing act in
1976. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 et seq. (West) (effective
July 1, 1977). See also Palmer, The Role bf Appellate Courts
in Mandatory Sentencing Schemes, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 753
(1979); Note, Determinative Sentencing In California and Illi-
nois: Its Effect on Sentence Disparity and Prisoner Rehabilitation,
55 WASH. L. REv. 551 (1979).
' 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
295465 S.W.2d 70, 75 (Ky. 1971).
m Edwards v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 396 (Ky.
1973).
297 Id. at 397.
2" Martin v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.2d 714 (Ky.
1973).
2507 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ky. 1974).
3oSee also Pennington v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d
618, 619 (Ky. 1972) (two years imprisonment upheld for
assault and destroying personal property).
"ol United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 604. In the
petition for rehearing in the Rosenberg case, Justice Frank-
furter filed a memorandum statement, Rosenberg v.
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one rule in the federal criminal practice which is
firmly established, it is that the appellate court has
no control over a sentence which is within the
limits allowed by a statute."
In Smith v. United States 02 another attempt at
review of the length of prison sentences was made.
It was based on the First Judiciary Act, which
states that the courts of the United States are
empowered to "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or
reverse any judgment, decree, or order . ..and
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment...
as may be just under the circumstances. ' ' 303 In
Smith, the defendant had been convicted of various
narcotic offenses and had been sentenced to con-
secutive sentences totaling fifty-two years. Smith
argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2106 allowed the circuit
court to order a reduction of his sentence. The
Tenth Circuit stated that the fifty-two-year sen-
tence was "greater than should have been im-
posed," a 4 but determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2106
did not allow for appellate reduction because of
the long-standing policy against appellate review
of sentencing.'°s
The first case in the federal courtss o to interfere
United States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952). In this statement
Justice Frankfurter stated:
Numerous grounds were urged in support of this
petition for certiorari; the petition for rehearing
raised five additional questions. So far as these
questions come within the power of this Court to
adjudicate, I do not, of course, imply any opinion
upon them. One of the questions, however, first
raised in the petition for rehearing, is beyond the
scope of the authority of this Court, and I deem it
appropriate to say so. A sentence imposed by a
United States district court, even though it be a
death sentence, is not within the power of this Court
to revise.
Id. at 890.
302 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959) (en banc), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 846 (1960).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976).
30' 273 F.2d at 467.
"05 Other American jurisdictions have implied a power
to review the length of criminal sentencing under similar
authorization. See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate
Review of Legal But Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. Rv.
671, 679-81 (1962). Appellate review of sentences under
doctrines other than the cruel and unusual punishment
rubric is not unusual in America. A discussion of this
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article.
' This statement is modified by the holding in United
States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970). In
McKinney the Sixth Circuit upheld a conviction for know-
ingly refusing to submit to induction into the armed
forces. The trial judge had sentenced McKinney to five
years imprisonment. In a one-paragraph consideration of
this sentence the court held that the five-year sentence
with a legislatively approved punishment is Ralph
v. Warden.30 7 In Ralph the Fourth Circuit held that
the death penalty imposed on a defendant guilty
of a rape that did not take or endanger the life of
his victim,308 constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The court employed two factors to determine
that the death penalty for this particular rape
constituted a disproportionate penalty. First, the
court noted that most American jurisdictions have
moved away from the death penalty for rape and
those jurisdictions that do provide for the death
penalty, have infrequently applied it.309 Second,
the court stated that imposing the death penalty
on a rapist who does not take or endanger the life
of his victim is "anomalous" when compared to the
large number of similar rapists sentenced to
prison.
3 10
The Fourth Circuit was also the first federal
court to interdict a legislatively mandated sentence
less than death. In Hart v. Coinera " the Fourth
Circuit considered the application of a West Vir-
ginia recidivist statute which mandated a life sen-
tence for a defendant convicted of a third felony.
In Hart the petitioner had been convicted of three
crimes, "punishable by confinement in a peniten-
tiary": (1) in 1949 he was convicted of writing a
check on insufficient funds in the amount of $50;
(2) in 1955 he was convicted of interstate transpor-
tation of forged checks worth $140; and (3) in 1968
he was convicted of perjury at his son's murder
was excessive. The court did not cite the legions of cases
in the federal courts denying such a power but did cite
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, and the dissenting
opinion in Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d at 468.
307 438 F.2d 786.
" On Petition for Rehearing, Chief Judge Hayns-
worth limited his concurrence to allow the death penalty
for rape only if "the victim suffered grievous physical or
psychological harm." Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d at 794.
Two circuit judges filed a dissent from the majority's
refusal to grant a rehearing en banc. Id. at 794-98.
s09 Id. at 790-93.
3 Id. at 793. When addressing the "infrequency argu-
ment" the court stated: "The reluctance to carry out
death sentences, however, is symptomatic of a national
and worldwide trend away from capital punishment."
438 F.2d at 792 n.21. The court presented no empirical
evidence that suggested the infrequency of execution
resulted from a loss of will as opposed to court interfer-
ence. The court apparently did not consider that by
eliminating the death penalty in Ralph, executions for
rape would become even more infrequent and therefore,
one can presume, unconstitutional for all rapes.
31i 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974). See also Note, Criminal Procedure-Eighth Amend-
ment Proportionality Analysis In Its Infancy, 52 N.C. L. Rev.
442 (1973).
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trial. Pursuant to the West Virginia habitual crim-
inal statute, Hart was sentenced to a mandatory
life sentence.
In holding that the life sentence was unconsti-
tutionally disproportionate to the underlying of-
fenses, the Fourth Circuit developed a series of
inquiries to test for disproportionality. First, the
court looked to the "nature of the offense itself"3 12
to determine the proportionality of the sentence.
The court did not assess the nature of the offense
in light of the state interest in determining habitual
offenders, but rather considered the gravity of the
underlying offenses. The court discounted the per-
jury conviction because the petitioner "faced a
moral dilemma: to choose between his duty to tell
the truth and family loyalty. ' 313 The gravity of the
check drawn on insufficient funds was considered
"very nearly trivial" '14 because "one penny less
in the face amount of the check and the offense
would have been a five to sixty-day petty misde-
meanor."315 The court never considered the relative
seriousness of the second offense, but it noted that
none of the offenses "involved violence or danger
of violence toward persons or property.
316
Second, the court chose to look behind the leg-
islative purpose in selecting the punishment.1 7 The
court dismissed the state's argument that the re-
cidivist law deterred others from committing felo-
nies and protected society from habitual criminals
by stating:
Such an argument proves too much. Assuming the
validity of the deterrent theory, and there is room
for doubt, then if a life sentence is good for the
purpose, surely a death sentence would be better.
Putting Hart in prison for the remainder of his life
for three offenses that rank relatively low in the
hierarchy of crimes would presumably prevent him
from passing bad checks but would not likely make
him a truthful man.18
Finally, the court added that "tradition, custom,
and common sense reserve [the life sentence] ...
for those violent persons who are dangerous to
others. It is not a practical solution to petty crime
312 483 F.2d at 140.
313 id.314 Id. at 141.
315 Id.316 id.
317 id.
318 Id. Of course, every sentence would fall if a death
sentence would be a better punishment. That a life
sentence would not make Dewey Hart a truthful man
simply misses the point, the life sentence certainly keeps
him from society.
in America. Aside from the proportionality prin-
ciple, there aren't enough prisons in America to
hold all the Harts that afflict us."
319
Third, the court compared Hart's life sentence
with punishment he would have received in other
jurisdictions.3 20 According to the Fourth Circuit,
only four states would have punished Hart with
the mandatory life sentence. The court did not
canvass the actual practices of the various jurisdic-
tions, but it did note that it would be unlikely that
any of the states that provided for a discretionary
life sentence would have sentenced the petitioner
to a life term. 2
Last, the court determined that the proportion-
ality analysis called for a comparison of the hier-
archical rank of punishment within the jurisdic-
tion.322 Since West Virginia called for a life sen-
tence for only three other crimes-murder, rape,
kidnapping-the Fourth Circuit held it was irra-
tional to punish Hart with a life sentence. While at
one part of the opinion the court stated that the
state could punish under a recidivist scheme,"ss the
court allowed the state to punish Hart "solely on
the basis of his perjury conviction. '32
The majority opinion in Hart drew a far-reaching
dissenting opinion325 from the panel's third mem-
ber, Judge Boreman. Boreman's dissent challenged
the Hart majority on two fundamental premises.
First, Judge Boreman argued that the majority had
wrongly relied on Yick Wo v. Hopkins3 26 for the
proposition that a valid recidivist statute could be
applied in an unconstitutional way. Judge Bore-
man read Yick Wo as preventing the public author-
ity from applying a valid statute with "an evil eye
and an unequal hand. 3 27 Since Hart was undis-
putably within the strictures of the West Virginia
recidivist statute, Judge Boreman argued that the
only discretion that could possibly be exercised was
the choice to prosecute under the recidivist statute
or merely charge a single offense. This discretion,
the dissent argued, was explicitly approved by the
Supreme Court in Oyler v. Boles.sss Since Hart could
not show that the valid West Virginia recidivist
statute was applied against him for improper rea-
319 Id.
= Id.
3' Id. at 142.
amId.
a'Id.
24 Id. at 143.
m Id. at 145 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
326 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
32 483 F.2d at 147 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
= 368 U.S. 448.
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sons, Judge Boreman argued that the majority
wrongly relied on the Yick Wo principle.32
Second, Judge Boreman took issue with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the West Virginia recidivist
statute was unconstitutionally applied to Hart.
Judge Boreman suggested that the majority im-
properly considered Hart's $50 check conviction
"very nearly trivial"3 30 because a check for any
other amount could be so characterized. The dis-
sent also questioned the propriety of the majority's
reasoning that the perjury conviction could be
discounted by the "moral dilemma"' faced by
Hart at his son's murder trial. Finally, Judge
Boreman referred to another Fourth Circuit dis-
proportionality case decided the same day as Hart
v. Coiner by the same panel. In Wood v. South Caro-
lina" a unanimous panel upheld a five-year sen-
tence for making obscene telephone calls. The per
curiam opinion expressed the view that the possible
maximum for making an obscene telephone call
was a "rather startling ten year"= sentence but
that the trial judge who sentenced Wood to five
years imprisonment was "doubtless" and
"properly" influenced by "Wood's prior criminal
record." 3
Judge Boreman argued that the Hart result was
inconsistent with Wood and added an important
footnote:
In our experience as practicing attorneys or, per-
haps, trial judges, how many times have cases come
to our attention where it was known to the prose-
cutor that an accused had issued a veritable flood
of bad checks but the prosecutor was satisfied to
accept a plea of guilty as to one and dismiss the
other charges? Is this not true with reference to
multiple offenses of other types and kinds such as
breaking and entering, robberies, and the like?
What can an appellate court possibly know of the
circumstances surrounding every recorded convic-
tion?=
The final Fourth Circuit proportionality case is
Davis v. Davis,33 6 where the defendant was convicted
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
a2 483 F.2d at 147. (Boreman, J., dissenting).
o Id. at 148.
331 id.
332 483 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973).
3 Id. at 150.
&u id.
3' 483 F.2d at 149 n.2.
336 Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va.
1977), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th
Cir. 1978), opinion vacated and district court opinion adopted,
601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated sub nom.
Hutto v. Davis, 100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980).
and of distribution of marijuana. The two offenses
involved less than nine ounces of marijuana and a
jury sentenced the defendant to two twenty-year
sentences and two $10,000 fines, and the trial judge
imposed the sentences consecutively. Applying the
Hart v. Coiner standards, a federal district court held
that the forty-year sentence and the $20,000 fine
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
33 7
A panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed and
reasoned that when the challenged sentence is one
for a term of years the analysis under the propor-
tionality theory "need not be as broad as the
inquiry used in Hart when a life sentence was
imposed."'3 According to the Davis panel, the
lesser inquiry looks only to a "consideration of the
seriousness of the offense committed."33 9 Since the
Davis jury was aware that Davis was "a drug dealer
by vocation"'3' the twenty-year sentence was not
excessive. The panel further reasoned that the trial
judge was justified in assessing the sentences con-
secutively because Davis previously had been con-
victed of selling LSD and had committed the two
marijuana offenses while he was on bail pending
appeal on the LSD offense.' 1 In a short per curiam
opinion, four of the seven Fourth Circuit judges
sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion and held
the forty-year sentence disproportionate under the
eighth amendment.'"
337 432 F. Supp. at 452.
33 585 F.2d at 1232.
&1 Id.
0o Id. at 1233.
341 id.
342 601 F.2d at 153. There are no other Fourth Circuit
cases finding punishments disproportionate. However,
other cases merit special mention. In Griffin v. Warden,
517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1975), the defendant had been
sentenced to the mandatory life sentence under the West
Virginia habitual criminal statute. The underlying of-
fenses were burglary, breaking and entering, and grand
larceny. The Griffin court upheld the life sentence and
dismissed Hart v. Coiner as involving no "violence and
danger to life as well as property." Id. at 757.
The Fourth Circuit has also upheld various sentences
against proportionality attack. See United States v. Wil-
liamson, 567 F.2d 610, 616 (4th Cir. 1977) (eight years
for possessing a firearm by a convicted felon); United
States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 38, 42 (4th Cir. 1975) (12
years for possession and distribution of heroin); United
States v. Cowles, 503 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1974) (two
years for unlawful possession of a firearm); Robinson v.
Warden, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972) (15 years for
assault with intent to commit murder).
In Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C..
1978), a federal district court in the Fourth Circuit held
that a 48- to 50-year sentence for safecracking was un-
constitutionally excessive. The defendant had prior con-
victions for breaking and entering, larceny, loafing and
loitering, and armed robbery, and an escape while he was
serving the armed robbery sentence. Id. at 377.
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The proportionality principle also was employed
by the Sixth Circuit to strike down an Ohio statute
mandating a ten-year minimum sentence for pos-
session of marijuana for sale and a twenty-year
minimum for sale of marijuana in Downey v. Per-
ini.3 3 Downey was vacated by the Supreme Court
in light of an Ohio statutory change which man-
dated review of prior marijuana sentences.
In 1967 Governor Rockefeller of New York pro-
posed a comprehensive revision of the state's drug
laws. The Second Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory penalties provided by
the laws in Carmona v. Wardm The New York
statute provided for indeterminate life sentences
for conviction of all narcotic drug sales and for
possession of narcotic drugs in quantities in excess
of one ounce. Depending upon various factors the
statute called for minimum sentences of fifteen, six,
and one year. All convictions carried a mandatory
life sentence. The New York Court of Appeals
unanimously upheld the penalty scheme in People
v. Brodie.345 The court accepted the proportionality
concept under the eighth amendment and the
typical analysis employed under that concept.
However, the court thought that the gravity of the
offense should be assessed more broadly than the
individual offenses committed by the challenging
defendants. To the New York court the offense was
a part of the "pernicious phenomenon of drug
distribution," 3 6 and not merely an isolated crimi-
nal offense.
After the state court failure, Brodie brought his
case to the federal district court in a habeas corpus
action. The challenge succeeded; the district court
held the New York court's analysis flawed because
"it is necessary to judge the proportionality of the
punishment with relation to the actual offense com-
mitted."' 7
A divided Second Circuit panel reversed the
district court. The challenge in the Second Circuit
involved two separate defendants. One defendant,
with a history of narcotic related offenses, was
343 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975), vacatedon other grounds,
423 U.S. 933 (1976). See also Note, Constitutional Law-
Cruel and Unusual Punishments-Eighth Amendment Prohibits
Excessively Long Sentences, 44 FOROHAM L. Rav. 637 (1975);
Note, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Appellate Sen-
tence Review, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 655.
"" 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1091 (1979).
3"' 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338.
34Id. at 112-13, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77, 332 N.E.2d
at 342.347Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1169
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979) (emphasis in original).
convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to
serve a term of six years to life. The other defendant
was convicted of the sale of $20 worth of cocaine
and sentenced to serve a term of four years to
life.34s The Second Circuit agreed with the New
York Court of Appeals that the offense should be
assessed in light of the total drug problem and not
as two isolated, nonviolent offenses involving rela-
tively small amounts of cocaine. 3 9 The Second
Circuit also disagreed with the district court's con-
clusion that eighth amendment proportionality
analysis requires the court to judge the severity of
punishment by the maximum possible term.' The
court determined that the term of imprisonment
should be discounted by the recognized probability
of parole. Using this standard, the court concluded
that New York was justified in placing severe
penalties for drug traffic because of the very serious
New York drug problem.3
1
One judge dissented from the panel opinion.3 2
He argued that the New York sentences should be
considered one for natural life and the petitioners'
crimes should be viewed as part of "the very lowest
level of the scale"=" of the drug traffic and that it
is improper to place all drug offenders within a
single category.
The petition for certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court, but Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justice Powell, filed a dissenting
opinion. 3 ' Justice Marshall termed the Second
Circuit's view of the nature of the offense "prob-
lematic 3"5 and inconsistent with the "fundamental
premise of the criminal justice system, that individ-
uals are accountable only for their own criminal
acts." 35 Justice Marshall also questioned the Sec-
ond Circuit's choice to discount the punishment by
the probability of parole.s 7 Justice Marshall called
this analysis "analytically unsatisfying."3 Finally,
Justice Marshall challenged the Second Circuit's
holding that a comparatively harsher drug law
may be based on a finding 9 that the problem is
more acute locally than nationally.
3 60
3m 576 F.2d at 407.
39 Id. at 412.
3 0Id. at 413.
'5i The court termed the New York problem a "pla-
gue." Id. at 415.
52Id. at 417 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
's Id. at 422.
354 439 U.S. at 1091.
"5 Id. at 1096.35Id.
357 Id. at 1098.
358Id.
359Justice Marshall also questioned this factual prem-
ise. Id. at 1101.360 Id.
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Justices Marshall and Powell were willing to
consider that Ward indicated that in the future the
full Court might consider the far-reaching ques-
tions raised by proportionality analysis.
THE RUMMEL OPINIONS
The proportionality issues raised by the state
courts and the lower federal courts came to a head
in Rummel v. Estelle.36 ' The various court opinions
in Rummel are particularly interesting: the panel
opinion adopted the analysis developed in Hart v.
Coiner s6 2 and applied the principles of Hart in a
generous manner; the en banc opinion also adopted
part of the Hart analysis, but deferred to legislative
choice; the Supreme Court opinion apparently
rejected the conceptual framework developed in
Hart and emphasized the limited nature of the
review under the eighth amendment.
THE RUMMEL FACTS
For at least one hundred and twenty years, Texas
law has provided for a mandatory life sentence
upon conviction of a third felony. In 1973 Rummel
was convicted of obtaining $120 by false preten-
ses.
3 63 At the punishment stage of Rummel's
361 Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, vacated, 587 F.2d
651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), affd, 100 S. Ct. 1133
(1980).
162 483 F.2d 136. See text accompanying notes 311-35
sup ra.
s Z Rummel was convicted under TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925), which provides: "Whoever
shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than
capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for
life in the penitentiary." As a matter of state law, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted this
statute to provide for a mandatory life sentence only
when each successive felony conviction is preceded by a
final felony conviction. Tyra v. State, 534 S.W.2d 695,
698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Under Texas law, a criminal
conviction is not final until the defendant is imprisoned.
No final conviction can result if the defendant success-
fully fulfills a probationary period.
The en banc court compared the Texas procedure with
states that activate habitual offender laws upon proof of
any previous conviction or simultaneous, multiple con-
victions. 587 F.2d at 656-59. State procedures under
habitual offender laws are explored in Note, supra note
199, at 78-79; Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 332 (1965).
In 1974, the Texas legislature apparently approved the
Court of Criminal Appeals' reading of the statute since
the requirements were made more explicit:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that
the defendant has previously been finally convicted
of the felony offenses, and the second previous felony
conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent
to the first previous conviction having become final,
on conviction he shall be punished by confinement
trial,3 64 the state proved that Rummel had been
convicted in 1969 of forging a $28 check365 The
state also established that Rummel had been con-
victed of presenting a credit card for an $80 bill
with intent to defraud in 1964.*3 The aggregate
amount stolen was $229. Finding that Rummel
had been convicted of two prior felonies and that
the felonies qualified under the Texas procedure
for enhancement, the trial judge sentenced Rum-
mel to a life term as required by the statute. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Rum-
mel's conviction.
36 7
After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain post-
conviction relief in the state courts, Rummel sought
federal habeas corpus relief in the Western District
of Texas. The district court denied relief without a
hearing and Rummel took an appeal to the Fifth
Circuit. By a divided vote, the panel reversed the
district court. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, then va-
cated the panel decision and affirmed the district





A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed the dis-
trict court, reasoning that under the criteria of Hart
v. Coiner,369 the life sentence violated the eighth
amendment. In Hart the Fourth Circuit set out four
factors to use in considering whether a punishment
violates the eighth amendment: (1) the nature of
the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind the
punishment; (3) the punishment the defendant
would have received in other jurisdictions, and (4)
in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.
TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, art. 12.42(d) (Vernon
1974).
36' Texas has bifurcated criminal trials. The jury must
first determine the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, then the jury returns for further argument in the
punishment stage and the jury retires for a second time
to decide punishment. If the jury unanimously deter-
mines the guilt but is unable to agree on punishment, a
mistrial must be declared and the state must again prove
guilt at the second trial. See-Bray v. State, 531 S.W. 2d
633 (Trex. Crim, App. 1976).
'16 TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 14, art. 996 (Vernon
1925).
36 6 TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 17, art. 1555b, § 1
(Vernon 1925).
367 Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974). The Texas court disavowed any power under the
eighth amendment to adjust a legislatively prescribed
sentence.
368 Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193. The panel ma-
jority consisted of Judges Clark and Goldberg. The dis-
sent was registered by Judge Thornberry.
369 483 F.2d 136. See text accompanying notes 311-35
supra.
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the punishments meted out for other offenses in
the same jurisdiction.
Under the first prong of the Hart test, the panel
looked to the nature of the offense.370 The panel
apparently thought that if any one of the under-
lying offenses involved "violence, a potential for
violence, or a strong social interest," a life sentence
would be constitutional.3 7' Although the panel did
not indicate which crimes involve a potential for
violence, it did suggest that laws involving narcot-
ics possess a strong social interest.372 Addressing the
question of the seriousness of Rummel's crimes the
panel stated:
None of Rummel's offenses present exacerbating
factors justifying a severe penalty. Considered in
combination, Rummel's crimes,, although felonies
under Texas law, lack those indicia of depravity
generally associated with felonies and the heinous-
ness of the offenses for which life imprisonment is a
common punishment. They were substantially sep-
arated in time. None involved violence or the po-
tential for violence. Each was solely a property
crime and the amounts taken were not
substantial.3 a
Second, the panel sought to determine the leg-
islative objective in making conduct a punishable
offense.37* According to the panel this "inquiry
seeks to determine whether a significantly less severe
punishment could achieve the purposes for which
the challenged punishment is inflicted. 375 The
panel recognized that an habitual offender law has
as its objective "protecting citizens from incorrigi-
ble repeat offenders. 3 7 6 However, the panel deter-
mined that this legislative interest could be
achieved by a lesser punishment. The panel
reached this conclusion by looking to the punish-
ment given recidivists in other jurisdictions and
370 Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d at 1197.
371 id.
M Id at 1198. Interestingly, the author of the panel
opinion, Judge Clark, upheld a 30-year sentence for
possession of a single marijuana cigarette in Rener v.
Beto, 447 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1051 (1972). In Rener, Judge Clark wrote:
This Circuit has long followed the principle that a
sentence within the statutory limits set by a legis-
lature is not to be considered cruel or unusual
[citations omitted]. A sentence of thirty years is
within the range of punishment prescribed by the
Texas Penal Code for a second offense of possession
of marijuana.
Id. at 23.
73 568 F.2d at 1198.
374 id.
375 Id. (emphasis in original).3 76 Id.
punishments given for other offenders in Texas, the
last two Hart factors.
Next, the panel compared Rummel's sentence
with the punishment accorded other crimes in
Texas. To this end the panel noted that Texas
imposes a mandatory life sentence only for capital
murder3 7 7 and punishes a single felony such as
murder, aggravated rape or arson with as little as
five years.378 The panel determined that these other
sentences demonstrate that Texas singles out the
habitual criminal for irrationally severe punish-
ment.
Last, the panel considered Rummel's sentence in
comparison with punishment accorded recidivists
in otherjurisdictions.3 9 Central to the panel's anal-
ysis is its determination that Rummel's life sentence
is one for his natural life, regardless of considera-
tions of parole and pardon. The panel so reasoned
because to consider parole is to interject the federal
courts into the parole process.3 ° In a canvass of
American jurisdictions, the panel discovered that
in addition to Texas, only Indiana, Washington,
and West Virginia require a mandatory life sen-
tence upon conviction of a third felony.38s How-
ever, the panel discounted the similar statutes for
various reasons: the West Virginia statute is limited
by Hart v. Coiner; the Indiana statute was recently
modified; and the Washington Supreme Court
would as a matter of state law honor the Hart
standards.m The panel then concluded that "the
state of Texas now stands virtually alone in its
unqualified demand for life imprisonment for a
three time felon."
M
The panel concluded that Rummel's life sen-
tence violated each of the Hart v. Coiner factors and
as such violated the eighth amendment. The court
concluded that the legislature had selected a pun-
ishment grossly disproportionate to the offense.M
In dissent, Judge Thornberry suggested that the
majority had assumed a legislative function. While
377 Id. at 1199. Under TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 19.03 (Vernon 1974), capital murder is punishable by
death or life imprisonment.
378 All three crimes are punished with prison terms
from five to 99 years. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5,§ 19.02 (murder); § 21.03 (aggravated rape); § 28.02
(arson).
379 568 F.2d at 1196.
3N Id.
ss Id. at 1199.
38 The Court drew this conclusion from a citation to
Hart in a footnote in State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932, 558
P.2d 236, 240 n.4 (1977) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 432
U.S. 901 (1977).




he expressed sympathy with Rummel's plight, he
stated that eighth amendment analysis cannot be
guided by personal "feelings of compassion and
justice."385 He attacked the majority's practice of
examining the underlying offenses to establish the
unconstitutionality of the punishment. He stated
that the offenses, as felonies, were the prerequisites
of the enhanced punishment, not the amounts
involved.P
THE EN BANC OPINION
The panel opinion provoked sufficient interest
to warrant a full court hearing by the Fifth Circuit.
On rehearing the panel's decision was narrowly
overturned.38 7 Although the new majority opinion
substantially accepted the conceptual framework
posited by the panel opinion, the emphasis was
markedly dissimilar.
The en bane court rejected the state's argument
that there is no power under the eighth amendment
to find a legislatively selected prison sentence un-
constitutional under a disproportionality theory.m
The court canvassed a mass of ill-defined and
conflicting cases.2 While many American jurisdic-
385 Id, at 1201.
386 Id. at 1201-02.
[Tihe majority focuses on the small amount of
money involved and the asserted triviality of all of
Rummel's offenses. But Rummel was not sentenced
to life imprisonment for stealing $230.00; the life
sentence resulted from his having committed three
separate and distinct felonies under the laws of
Texas. If the state is entitled to characterize a
particular criminal act as a felony, and to enforce
its constitutional habitual criminal statute, I cannot
understand how these two constitutional statutes
coalesce to produce an unconstitutional result
.... I know of no stopping point for today's decision.
Id.
387 Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651.
"yId. at 654-55.
389 The court divided its research into four groups of
cases. The first group consisted of Fifth Circuit cases
denying any power under the eighth amendment to test
the length of prison sentences. Id. at 654 n.3. The second
group catalogued cases from other jurisdictions claiming
no power under the eight amendment for disproportion-
ality analysis. Id. at 654 n.4. The third group of cases
from the Fifth Circuit admitted power under the eighth
amendment to test the length of prison sentences. Id. at
654 n.5. Typical of these cases was Rogers v. United
States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1962), in which the
court said a punishment could be cruel and unusual if
"it is so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed
as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of
justice." No case, however, interdicted a prison term
under this theory. The last group consisted of cases from
otherjurisdictions claiming to review the length of prison
sentences. 587 F.2d at 655 n.6. Several of these cases
tions spoke of a power in the eighth amendment to
review the constitutionality of prison sentences, at
the time of the court's writing, only and litigant
had been relieved of a prison term through habeas
corpus litigation in federal court,390 and only a
handful had been relieved of prison terms in state
court. 391 Moreover, the court also was able to dis-
cover many cases which flatly rejected any power
to review the length of sentences under the eighth
amendment.3 92
While expressing doubts as to the historical foun-
dation of disproportionality theory, the court con-
cluded that such analysis was contained in the
eighth amendment. An apparent dispositive factor
in the court's choice was the recognition of dispro-
portionality analysis by individual members of the
Supreme Court in death cases.393 Furthermore, the
court was aware that the Supreme Court had
invalidated a death sentence for rape in Coker v.
Georgia39H under disproportionality theory.
Since the en banc court accepted the validity of
disproportionality analysis, it was forced to artic-
ulate a set of standards. To this end, the court
accepted three of the four Hart v. Coiner standards
used by the panel opinion; however, the en banc
court concluded the panel erred by failing to up-
hold a sentence "if there is any rational basis for so
doing." 395 The court started with the proposition
that the Texas habitual criminal law is constitu-
tional.396 The court then turned to a discussion of
the Hart standards emphasized in the panel opin-
ion.
First, the en bane court agreed with the panel's
actually found a prison sentence unconstitutionally ex-
cessive, some on explicit eighth amendment grounds and
others on an uncertain theoretical basis.
390 At the time of the court's writing, Dewey Hart was
the only litigant relieved of a prison sentence in a circuit
court under a disproportionality theory. Hart v. Coiner,
483 F.2d 136. Six months after the en bane Rummel opinion,
the Fourth Circuit en bane by a four-to-three vote released
a petitioner who was serving a 40-year sentence for
possession and distribution of marijuana. Davis v. Davis,
601 F.2d 153.
391 Litigants have been relieved of prison sentences in
several state courts. These cases are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 221-359 supra.
392 587 F.2d at 654 nn.3, 4.
39 Id. at 655.
394 433 U.S. 584.
3- 587 F.2d at 656.
396 Id. The court relied on Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554. See text accompanying note 214 for the Court's
language.
For a criticism that the Court's language in Spencer was
too broad, see Katkin, supra note 200, at 113-15.
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conclusion to look to the nature of the offense.3 7
The en banc court, however, took a radically differ-
ent approach from the panel's inquiry. The panel
had looked to the underlying offenses, in this case
three relatively minor thefts, but the en banc court
concluded that the three separate and distinct
convictions comprised the proper focus of
inquiry.3 98 In short, the court treated the status of
habitual criminal as a distinct offense, apart from
the underlying offenses. The court said that it
arrived at this conclusion via the "first principle
of... analysis-that every inference is to be made




Moreover, the en banc court stressed its conclusion
that the probability of parole should be taken into
account.4°° To the majority, the enhanced recidivist
punishment was not a sentence for natural life, but
a sentence for between ten and twelve years, with
further incarceration conditioned on good behav-
ior.40 The court concluded that a sentence of at
least ten years did not violate the eighth amend-
ment. 0 2 For this proposition the court relied on
two Fourth Circuit cases: one upholding a five-
year sentence for making an obscene phone call;
4 °
s
the other upholding a forty-year sentence for pos-
session and distribution of marijuana. 404
39 587 F.2d at 659.
m Id.
3 Id.
40 Id. at 658-59.
4o1 Id. at 657-58. Under Texas law, every prisoner is
eligible for parole after serving 20 years or one-third of
his sentence, whichever is less. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. art. 42.12 § 15(a) (Vernon 1974). The 20-year
maximum is not calendar years, but is further reduced
by "good time credits." The good time system in Texas
is generous and well developed. All prisoners earn 50
days credit for every 30 served during periods of good
behavior. There are also two disciplinary classes; one
class earns 40 days for 30 days and the harshest discipli-
nary class earns day-for-day time. There is a super-class
of state approved trusties, the best of the prisoners, who
cam 60 days for 30 calendar days. Therefore, under the
Texas system, a life sentence can be served in between
ten and twelve years, depending upon status and assum-
ing appropriate prison behavior. The en banc court noted
that Rummel has been serving time as a state approved
trusty since March 1, 1977. 587 F.2d at 660 n.16. The
Texas good time system is explained more fully in Jack-
son, Hard Times, TExAs MONTHLY, December 1978, at
138, 258.
402 587 F.2d at 659.
'0 Wood v. South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149. Wood was
decided by the same Fourth Circuit panel that decided
Hart v. Coiner.
'04 Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226. The 40-year sentence
in Davis was a jury determination and not a mandatory
sentence. The panel decision in Davis was later reversed
by the Fourth Circuit en banc, which, in turn, was reversed
by the Supreme Court. Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th
Second, the court agreed with the panel that
under eighth amendment disproportionality anal-
ysis, the court should compare Rummel's Texas
sentence with those imposed in other jurisdic-
tions.4°5 The court admitted that if it is necessary
to consider Rummel's Texas sentence as one for
natural life, then Texas punishes habitual criminals
who are guilty of property crimes more severely
than other states.4°6 Furthermore, one reading of
the majority opinion supports the view that a
sentence for natural life would be unconstitution-
ally disproportionate. 07 The majority, however,
thought actual jail time measured by rational ex-
pectations was a better gauge for this comparison
than the actual judgment of conviction.408 Using
this standard the court determined that Rummel's
actual jail time would "not be significantly longer
in Texas than his jail time in many other states.
In making this review the court was careful to
note that the appellate record devdl'oped in Rummel
was a product of the unique Texas procedure in
habitual criminal cases. Eleven states,41 according
to the court, provide for a discretionary life sen-
tence for a person in Rummel's position. In noting
Cir. 1979) (en bane), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 100
5. Ct. 1593 (1980). The en banc court in Davis made no
mention of the Fifth Circuit's rejection of a differing
standard between life sentences and sentences for a term
of years. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d at 656 n.8.
4os 587 F.2d at 659.
406Id.
407 The majority opinion states:
The panel majority argued that comparison of
Rummel's sentence with the sentences imposed in
other jurisdictions confirms the gross disproportion-
ality of Rummel's sentence. 568 F.2d at 1199.... We
believe that the evidence on this point is, at best
inconclusive. Of course, if the court is forced to
assume that Rummel's sentence is automatically
and invariably one for his natural life, then the
majority's assertion is probably accurate.
587 F.2d at 659.
If one reads the "majority's assertion" to refer to
"confirms the gross disproportionality of Rummel's sen-
tence," then the en banc opinion can be read to hold a
sentence for natural life without possibility of parole
unconstitutional. The en banc dissent takes this reading.
Id. at 665-66.
The other reading would read the majority's assertibn
to refer to a comparison made by the panel opinion
without comment as to the legal effect of such compari-
son.
08 587 F.2d at 659-60.
4m Id. at 659. The court reached this conclusion by
surveying other jurisdictions.
41o The court noted that three states punish a four-time
felon with a mandatory life sentence and eight states give
discretionary power to punish a three-time felon with a




this, the court said that at first glance it appeared
that none of the other eleven states would sentence
Rummel to the maximum life term. However,
taking into account the peculiar Texas system and
the fact that the court did not examine Rummel's
entire record, it was possible that he would have
received the same sentence in the other states. n
The limitation inherent in the Texas enhance-
ment procedure moved the District Attorney of
Bexar County, Texas, to file an amicus brief in
which he contended that Rummel had been con-
victed of at least twelve separate crimes over his
criminal career,412 but because of the peculiarities
of the Texas system only the minor property con-
victions could be used for enhancement. Conse-
quently, the court, while bound by the appellate
411 Id. at 660.
412 According to the Amicus Brief filed by the District
Attorney of Bexar County, Texas, Rummel's full record
is: 0
1. Convicted October 20, 1959 of Misdemeanor
Theft in cause no. 68554.
2. Convicted October 20, 1959 of Unlawful Pos-
session of Alcoholic Beverages, cause no. 68553.
3. Convicted January 21, 1960 of Unlawfully
Carrying a Deadly Weapon in County Court
No. 1, Bexar County, Texas.
4. Convicted May 17, 1960 of Burglary in cause
no. 3357 in the 81st District of Karnes County,
Texas. Granted three years probation.
5. Convicted March 6, 1964 of Swindling by
Check in cause no. 144938 in County Court,
Bexar County, Texas.
6. Convicted March 6, 1964 of Swindling by
Check in cause no 144864 in County Court,
Bexar County, Texas.
7. Convicted December 15, 1964 of Presentation
of Credit Card With Intent to Defraud in cause
no. 64306 in the 144th District Court, Bexar
County, Texas.
8. Violated parole on July 21, 1966. Returned to
the Texas Dept. of Corrections on August 25,
1966.
9. Convicted February 21, 1968 of Aggravated
Assault on a Female in cause no. 157124 in
County Court No. 3, Bexar County, Texas.
10. Convicted April 3, 1968 of Swindling by Check
in cause no. 167599 in County Court, Bexar
County, Texas.
11. Convicted March 11, 1969 of Forgery in cause
no. 68977, in the 144th District Court, Bexar
County, Texas.
12. Convicted April 10, 1973 of Swindling by Check
Over 550 in cause no. 72-2721 in the 187th
District Court, Bexar County, Texas.
13. Convicted April 10, 1973 of Theft of Property
Over the Value of $50 (Habitual) in cause no.
73-CR-214 in the 187th District Court of Bexar
County, Texas.
Brief for the Amicus Curiae at 3, District Attorney of
Bexar County, Texas, Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133.
record developed in the case, apparently believed
that factors other than those apparent under the
state procedural system were relevant to the pro-
portionality analysis.
Next, the en banc court held that while it consid-
ered the internal ranking of punishments a state
selects as relevant to the proportionality analysis,
it felt that in Rummel's case it was inappropriate
to compare the punishment given for one crime
with the punishment given under the recidivist
statute.4 13 Finally, the court rejected the panel's
attempt to determine if the state's purpose in se-
lecting a sentence could be served by a significantly
lesser punishment.4 4 The court refused to make
this inquiry because it was not convinced that a
majority of the Supreme Court had embraced this
test in death cases, and it was convinced that for
penalties less than death, a state would never be
able to justify the particular penalty selected by
the legislature.415
The en banc majority concluded that while much
could be said against the Texas habitual criminal
statute, the judicial function did not include re-
weighing of the choices made by the Texas legis-
lature. Throughout the litigation Rummel had
argued that all three of his crimes were nonviolent
and that the Texas recidivist statute should be
applied only when one of the crimes was violent.
The court answered that while Rummel may have
suggested a rational system perhaps better than the
one selected by Texas, his burden under the eighth
amendment was to prove that Texas' system was
irrational, not to posit a better system.
Six members of the fourteen-member court dis-
sented from the majority opinion. The dissent took
issue with the majority's inclusion of the probabil-
ity of parole into the eighth amendment calculus.
The dissent argued that a defendant has no consti-
tutional right to parole and that since the parole
process was largely immune from judicial review,
parole gave the prisoner no protectable expectation
of release.41 7
RUMMEL IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
en banc decision by a five-to-four vote.458 Justice
413 587 F.2d at 660.
414 Id. at 660-61.
415 Id. at 661.
416Id. at 662.
417 Id.at 666-67.
418 100 S. Ct. 1133. The opinion for the Court was
written by Justice Rehnquist. His opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White and
Blackmun. Justice Stewart also filed a concurring opin-
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Rehnquist's majority opinion carefully noted that
Rummel did not involve a challenge to recidivist
statutes generally, nor did the case question the
state's authority to make any of Rummel's three
crimes a felony.
4 19
The Court's analysis proceeded from the propo-
sition that the proportionality language in the
capital punishment line of cases is "of limited
assistance" 4"2 when determining the constitution-
ality of a sentence less than death. Moreover, the
Court read Weens v. United States as limited to "the
extreme facts of that case. ' 421 To the Court, the
Weems holding resulted from a combination of
factors: the triviality of the offense, the length of
the minimum term sentence, and the extraordinary
nature of the post-imprisonment punishment in-
cluded within cadena temporal.422 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the existing caselaw in the
Supreme Court allowed the state to punish any
behavior properly classified as a felony with any
length of imprisonment "purely [as] a matter of
legislative grace. ,
423
The Court read Coker v. Georgia and Weems v.
United States as providing a set of objective stan-
dards for assessing the proportionality of punish-
ments: Coker because of the uniqueness of the death
penalty42A and Weems because of the unusual nature
of cadena temporal.4? Justice Rehnquist then sug-
gested that when the challenge to a punishment
goes merely to its length, as compared to the
seriousness of the offense, the choice becomes a
subjective one.42s
Starting with Hart v. Coiner, and followed by the
panel and en banc opinions in Rummel, the lower
federal courts obviously recognized the difficulty
in establishing a set of objective standards for
determining proportionality. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the Hart and Rummel panel deter-
minations that the presence or absence of violence
is an objective standard upon which to base a
proportionality determination. 427 Justice Rehn-
quist suggested that a high official in a large cor-
ion. Id. at 1145, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion.Id.
419 Id. at 1136.420 Id. at 1138.
421 Id.
422 Id. at 1139.
423 Id.
424 Id.
42 Id. at 1139-40.426 Id. at 1140.427Id. See also id. at 1143 n.27.
poration can commit "undeniably serious ' 28
crimes without the violence. Moreover, Justice
Rehnquist discounted the relatively small amounts
of money taken by Rummel's various criminal
enterprises. 429 Indeed, the Court points out that
had Rummel stolen no money, this fact would
prove only lack of success as a thief, not the petty
nature of the crime.
43
0
While a different question might be presented
were Rummel imprisoned for life for the single
criminal theft of $120, the Court determined that
in Rummel's case, the dispositive factor was Rum-
mel's failure to conform his behavior "to the norms
of society as established by its criminal law."
431
Therefore, the social interest involved much more
than deterring a single theft.
In Hart and Rummel, the lower federal courts
frequently looked to the punishments accorded the
offender in other jurisdictions as factors to employ
in proportionality analysis. While the Supreme
Court did not specifically endorse this practice, it
appears that the Rummel opinion adopted this ap-
proach since the Court engaged in an extended
analysis to rebut Rummel's proposition that "no
jurisdiction in the United States or the Free World
punishes habitual criminals as harshly as Texas. ,
4
32
However, the Court suggests that comparison be-
tween jurisdictions takes more than an interjuris-
dictional comparison from the pages of a statute
book. For example, the Court notes Texas' strict
rules for the application of its habitual criminal
statutess and the subtle differences between the
habitual criminal acts of various states such as the
application of a life sentence upon the fourth fe-
lony.' 34 Moreover, the Court, while agreeing that
the life sentence should not be considered a twelve-
year sentence because of the goodtime provisions
of the Texas law,435 determined that the proper
assessment of the sentences includes a recognition
of the good time and parole process. 436 Finally, the
Court suggested that even if Rummel could dem-
onstrate that his punishment is more severe than
that of any other jurisdiction, Rummel would have
42 9 Id.
4n Id.
411 Id. The same opinion is expressed at the conclusion
of Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Id. at 1144-45.
432 Id. at 1141.
4" Id. See note 262 supra for a description of the work-
ings of the Texas habitual criminal statute.





failed to prove his case for disproportionality. 437
The Court's opinion apparently rejects the Hart
approach of an intrajurisdictional analysis of the
seriousness of crimes because such a ranking is
"inherently speculative. ' 4' Moreover, the Court
does not mention the Hart test which asks whether
a lesser punishment would fulfill the legislative
purpose behind a punishment.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist observed that under
the concept of federalism, the states have long
enjoyed great leeway in establishing the relative
harshness of punishments. Therefore Texas, in
finding Rummel a repeat offender, had a legiti-
mate interest in isolating him from society, apart
from the interest in deterring the commission of a
single crime. 39
Justice Powell dissented. Like the Fifth Circuit
en banc minority, he took issue with the majority's
consideration of a state's practices concerning pa-
role and discretionary release." 0 Justice Powell
argued that a prisoner has no liberty interest in
parole and that consideration of parole was unduly
speculative. 4' Justice Powell argued for the adop-
tion of three of the four Hart v. Coiner standards."4
After a review of these standards, Justice Powell
concluded that Rummel's crimes were relatively
insignificant 443 and that Texas punishes a person
in Rummel's position more harshly than most other
American jurisdictions444 and more harshly than it
punishes others who commit more serious crimes.445
Justice Powell recognized the difficulty inherent
in the subjective nature of the proportionality in-
quiry." 6 However, he concluded that this difficulty
does not prohibit the Court from developing ascer-
tainable standards. 4 7 Justice Powell called the
"flood gates" argument "easy to make and difficult
to rebut."44 To him the Fourth Circuit experience
4 7 Id. at 1143.
4 0Id. at 1143 n.27. But see Terrebonne v. Blackburn,
624 F.2d 1363, (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Supreme
Court's affirmance of Rummet leaves intact the propor-
tionality analysis adopted by the en bane court).
4 9 100 S. Ct. at 1144-45.
440 Id. at 1150.
441id.
"2 Id. The inquiries are (1) looking to the nature of the
offense; (2) comparing the selected punishment with the
punishment accorded in other jurisdictions; and (3) com-
paring the sentence imposed for the offense with other
sentences imposed by the same state for other offenses.
43 Id. at 1150.
444 Id. at 1150-53.
45 Id. at 1153.
446 Id. at 1154.
"' Id. at 1156.
448 Id. at 1154.
with the proportionality question demonstrated
that the lines were not impossible to draw. 49 Jus-
tice Powell concluded by observing that Rummel's
sentence "would be viewed as grossly unjust by




This article has reviewed the original meaning
of the eighth amendment and its development in
the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and
the state courts. This article will now attempt to
apply the learning gained from the prior review to
Rummel v. Estelle. This section will address the
questions unique to Rummel and problems raised
by proportionality analysis generally. Despite what
Newsweek calls the compelling case of William
Rummel, this article argues that the Supreme
Court has reached a fair resolution of this difficult
constitutional problem.
THE PROaLEM OF AN "AS APPLIED" AT-rACK
Given the extraordinarily broad approval of the
Texas habitual criminal statute in Spencer v. Texas,
Rummel did not challenge the constitutionality of
the Texas statute. Instead, Rummel argued that
the constitutional habitual criminal statute was
being applied in an unconstitutional manner. This
argument was accepted by the Fourth Circuit in
Hart v. Coiner and the Fifth Circuit panel in Rummel.
Both courts relied primarily on Yick Wo v. Hopkins451
for this proposition. In Yick Wo the Supreme Court
struck down the application of an otherwise neutral
law because it was "applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand.
452
It must be clear that the "as applied" attack in
Rummel is not within this principle. Rummel does
not argue that the Texas authorities applied the
recidivist statute on the basis of some impermissible
motivation. Indeed, if this were his attack, it would
clearly be within the ambit of Oyler v. Boles.
4 5
3
Answering the problem raised by an as applied
attack involves far more than a citation to an
inappropriate case. Logically, an acceptance of the
as applied attack should lead to the requirement
that a criminal sentence be individualized both as
to the character of the offender and the relative
gravity of a specific act within the universe of the
offense.
449 Id. at 1154-56.4
5Id. at 1156.
45' 118 U.S. 356.
4 2 Id. at 373, 374.
4 368 U.S. 448.
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Most courts to accept the proportionality con-
cept examine only the nature of the offense to
determine its place in the hierarchy of criminal
behavior. Other courts have added the requirement
that the court inquire into the nature of the of-
fender as well. For example, in Anderson v. Common-
wealth454 and Edwards v. Commonwealth 455 both of-
fenders were guilty of rape under approximately
equal conditions, the only difference being that the
offender in Anderson was sixteen years old and the
offender in Edwards was eighteen years old. The
Kentucky court struck down the punishment in
Anderson while upholding the life sentence without
possibility of parole in Edwards. Similarly, the
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Lorentzen456
noted that the defendant convicted of a small-scale
sale of marijuana was a first offender gainfully
employed. In Wood v. South Carolina,457 the Fourth
Circuit upheld a five-year sentence for making an
obscene telephone call. In so doing the court noted,
"The sentencing judge was doubtless influenced
and properly so, by Wood's prior criminal
record.•, 418 If these courts are correct, the eighth
amendment must also require that the punishment
be proportioned to the offender as well as to the
offense. This raises the difficult problem of how the
courts, and more troubling, the appellate courts,
are to know the character of the offender.
In Rummel, the petitioner evades this conclusion
and demands that the court look only to the nature
of the three property offenses. As this article has
previously mentioned, the indictment upon which
Rummel was convicted alleges only the three prop-
erty crimes because of the requirements of Texas
law. The state is anxious to show that Rummel, in
fact, has been convicted of many other crimes and
has been to prison on at least three prior occasions.
Rummel argues that the state's offer of proof is
immaterial because "by mandating life sentences
for those convicted of a third felony the Texas
Legislature foreclosed proof of mitigating circum-
stances and pleas for mercy and compassion."
459
This position is analytically sound, yet troubling.
On the one hand, Rummel insists that he is entitled
to an as-applied attack upon a constitutionally
proper statute, but, on the other hand, the state is
4- 465 S.W.2d at 75.
45 500 S.W.2d 396.
4s6 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827.
457 483 F.2d 149.4
-1 Id. at 150.
49 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, 6, Rummel v. Estelle,
100 S. Ct. 1133.
not entitled to show that Rummel received an
appropriate sentence. Perhaps the mandatory na-
ture of the sentence makes Rummel's argument
correct. But if this is so, then Rummel is not
arguing that his sentence is disproportionate, but
that the mandatory nature of the sentence is unfair
and unconstitutional.
The Rummel Court did not specifically address
the problems generated by an as-applied attack
but it did mention the complexities inherent in
selecting a constitutionally appropriate sentence.
4 0
Rhetorically, the Court asked if the state could re-
sentence Rummel to life imprisonment, based on
his full record in the event that the life sentence for
the three charged felonies was unconstitutional.46'
The Court does not answer this question, but the
question illustrates the difficulty in the as-applied
attack.
Additional evidence of this position can be
gained from Rummel's admission that, if a judge
or jury had independently assessed Rummel's life
sentence, his objections would lose their force.4e
This position is analytically unsound. If Rummel's
life sentence is disproportionate under the eighth
amendment, it can be no less so simply because a
judge or jury assessed the punishment. In fact, the
Fourth Circuit flatly rejected Rummel's argument
in Davis v. Davis46s in which the en banc court found
a sentence selected by a judge and jury, dispropor-
tionately severe for the sale of marijuana.
The most difficult case, and the case that must
follow Rummel, is an attack on a sentence selected
by a jury for aggravating circumstances for which
the defendant was not convicted. In Cobern v. State464
the state of Alabama exacted the death penalty for
robbery of a 1957 Chevrolet. By any standard, one
must agree that this penalty is disproportionate in
the abstract. However, the court's description of
the robbery may lead to a different conclusion:
The circumstantial evidence, aside from appellant's
confession, shows rather conclusively that he mur-
dered Mamie Belle Walker, took some of herjewelry
and her automobile, and left the state. The body
was in a deplorable condition, her skull practically
beaten into pieces, a 22 caliber rifle bullet wound in
the chest which penetrated the body. The doctor
testified that these two wounds were sufficient to
460 100 S. Ct. at 1143.
461 id.
46 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S.
Ct. 1133.
463601 F.2d 153.
4 273 Ala. 547, 142 So. 2d 869 (1962).
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cause death. Her body was otherwise bruised and
mutilated, including the puncturing of her vaginal
area, evidently with a poker found in the room, on
which were vaginal hairs similar to those of the
victim.465
Cobern was not convicted of rape and murder, but
if Cobern were to argue that his death sentence is
disproportionate to his offense, is the court bound
to look only at the face of the conviction?
Another example concerns the story broadcast
on the popular CBS Show, Sixty Minutes, of a
Florida woman who received a fifteen-year prison
sentence for a five dollar theft. In the abstract, this
penalty also seems disproportionately severe. How-
ever, the sentence was the product of plea bargain-
ing. The woman could have been charged with
auto theft, kidnapping, and armed robbery. In
exchange for dropping the other charges, the
woman pleaded guilty to taking a five dollar bill
from a purse during the kidnapping. If this woman
were to argue that her sentence is disproportionate,
is the state allowed to justify the sentence with
information outside the record and outside the
formal proof of trial?4'
While this problem was avoidable in Rummel
because of the mandatory nature of the penalty,
the problem will arise under other sentencing
schemes. In Williams v. New York46 7 the Supreme
Court upheld the use of a presentence report in the
sentencing decision even though the report had not
formally been admitted into evidence. In Williams,
the defendant had been convicted of murder, and
the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death.
In doing so, the trial judge relied on the pre-
sentence report which accused the defendant of
thirty burglaries even though the defendant had
never been convicted of any of the burglaries.
Williams strongly suggests that the state ought to
be able to justify a defendant's sentence with in-
formation concerning the nature of plea bargain-
ing, and the nature of other offenses committed by
the defendant.
THE QUESTION OF PAROLE
Simply stated, the problem here is whether the
probability of parole ought to be counted in the
eighth amendment proportionality calculus. The
465 Id. at 549, 142 So. 2d at 869-70.
" Five Dollar Mistake, Sixty Minutes, (CBS), Oct. 7,
1979.
467 337 U.S. 241. See also Roberts v. United States, 100
S. Ct. 1358 (1980) (court may properly consider that a
defendant failed to cooperate with government by failing
to name coconspirators in assessing sentence.).
arguments on both sides are good ones and, oddly,
the question is as old as proportionality analysis
itself.
The first case to clearly admit to the proportion-
ality concept, McDonald v. Commonwealth,46s dis-
counted a mandatory twenty-five year sentence by
the possibility of parole and discretionary release.
The first case to unambiguously find a prison
sentence disproportionate reached the opposite
conclusion in State v. Kimbrough,46 9 because "[p]ar-
don, parole or commutation is an act of grace and
another of discretion, and may be refused. ' 4 70
In People v. Lorentzen,17 the Michigan Supreme
Court apparently followed McDonald and noted
that an offender serving a twenty-year sentence
could be released from prison after serving less
than eleven years. In In re Lynch4 72 the California
Supreme Court held that a sentence under the
California indeterminate sentencing law should be
treated, for proportionality purposes, as one for life.
Finally in Carmona v. Ward473 the Second Circuit
held that the possibility of parole should be consid-
ered when assessing the gravity of a punishment
under the eighth amendment.
47 4
The Maximum Sentence Argument
The first court to engage in an extensive analysis
of the parole probability in proportionality analysis
was the Supreme Court of California in In re
Lynch.4 75 The California court's analysis was heav-
ily influenced by local conditions. According to the
Lynch court, three factors directed that the Califor-
nia indeterminate sentence be treated as a sentence
for the maximum possible term. Two of the fac-
tors-the California view of the theory behind the
indeterminate sentencing law476 and the prior ju-
dicial treatment of the law by the California
courts4 7 7-are not directly relevant to the consti-
tutional question under the eighth amendment.
The third factor given by the California court-
4rS 173 Mass. at 328, 53 N.E. at 875.
40 46 S.E.2d 273 (S.C. 1948).
470 Id. at 277.
471 387 Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 833.
4728 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217.
473 576 F.2d 405.
474 More specifically, this view can take two concepts.
First, the sentence can be viewed as simply less severe
than it first appears. Second, the discount can be applied
when the sentence is compared to sentences in other
jurisdictions.
4758 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217.
476 Id. at 416, 503 P.2d at 924-25, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
220-21.
477 Id. at 417-18, 503 P.2d at 925-26, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
221-22.
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that the defendant has no vested right to parole or
release prior to the expiration of the sentence4 s -
is directly relevant to the constitutional argument.
There is, of course, an allure to this argument.
Parole and discretionary release are only a "mere
hope." In Greenholtz v. Inmates47 9 the Supreme Court
held that the possibility of parole creates no liberty
interest protected by due process. A second argu-
ment supporting this position is that if the possi-
bility of parole is considered, no defendant will
ever again have the opportunity to argue to a court
that his sentence is excessive as the executive au-
thorities will become the "ultimate arbiters in
eighth amendment analysis." 48 The third argu-
ment advanced for not considering parole is that
the "added 'crime' of a 'bad attitude' in prison
' 481
would probably prohibit parole and could make a
sentence excessive. The final argument made in
favor of the no parole consideration position is that
even after the defendant is released from incarcer-
ation, he would be subject to rules and conditions
adopted by the relevant state authorities with the
concomitant threat of prison hanging over him for
minor, noncriminal violations. "
2
The Possibility of Parole Argument
The Second Circuit was the first court to explic-
itly conclude that the possibility of parole should
be considered in the eighth amendment formula.
In Carmona v. Ward48 that court argued that it is
unrealistic to assume that on one hand the court
should consider all the mitigating circumstances of
the crime but on the other hand assume that the
offender will be so incorrigible that he will never
478 Id. at 417, 503 P.2d at 925, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
479 442 U.S. 1 (1979). But see Dumschat v. Board of
Pardons, 593 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.), vacated, 442 U.S. 926
(1979), on remand, 618 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1980). In Dum-
schat, the Second District held that inmates serving life
sentences in Connecticut were entitled to a written state-
ment from the Board of Pardons explaining the denial of
their application for pardon. The Supreme Court vacated
and remanded in light of Greenholtz. Upon remand, the
Second Circuit affirmed its prior holding and remanded
the case to the district court to determine "at what point
in an inmate's incarceration the likelihood of his receiving
a pardon becomes sufficiently great to vest him with a
protected 'liberty' interest and due process rights." 618
F.2d at 217.
480 Brief for Petitioner at 33-34, Rummel v. Estelle,
100 S. Ct. 1133. The argument is taken from Note,
Recidivist Laws Under The Eighth Amendment-Rummel v.
Estelle, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 606, 633 (1978).
481 Brief for Petitioner at 35, Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S.
Ct. 1133.
"2 Id. at 36, 37.
40 576 F.2d at 405.
gain parole.4s The court further added that while
parole is not a vested right, it is inappropriate to
assume that the local authorities will improperly
deny conditional release. 85
In Rummel the Fifth Circuit, en banc, followed the
Second Circuit's analysis. The Rummel court added
to the Second Circuit's reasoning that to "ignore
the Texas good time system is to close our eyes to
reality" 4s6 and to assume that the life sentence is
one without the possibility of parole.
The real world argument was best expressed by
the Rummel court in its comparison of Rummel's
punishment with those in other states:
Me... have held that the likely probability of
Rummel's jail term should be compared with the
experience of other states. This Rummel has not
done, and our research suggests that Rummel's
actual jail time would not be significantly longer in
Texas than his jail time in many other states. An
example will illustrate our point. Suppose that State
A gives a ten-year sentence for the same theft. State
A has a practice of fixed and determinate sentences
and does not award early release based on good
time or discretionary parole. State B, however, is
similar to Texas and through long experience it can
be shown that the thirty-year sentence amounts to
about ten years imprisonment. Can it justifiably be
said that State B punishes the theft three times more
severely than State A? This Court thinks not.4 7
Suggested Resolution
Of the arguments offered in support of not con-
sidering parole, only the "no vested right" position
is substantial. The argument that if parole is con-
sidered, the defendant will never have the oppor-
tunity to have his sentence tested and his future
bad attitude may preclude parole forever, is insub-
stantial. There is no reason why a defendant serv-
ing an indeterminate sentence may not, some time
in the future, argue that he has served a constitu-
tionally appropriate sentence and therefore is en-
titled to relief. Indeed, there is precedent for such
a position. In In re Rodriquez488 the defendant had
served twenty-two years of an indeterminate sen-
tence for conviction for lewd and lascivious acts on
a child. The California Supreme Court held that,
considering the circumstances, the twenty-two-year
sentence was excessive.
The argument concerning the lifetime parole
4m Id. at 414.
48Id.
486 587 F.2d at 660.
487 Id.
488 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552.
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status is overstated. The Rummel Court gave the
argument short shrift by stating that "[R]ummel
suggests that even if he is paroled, he is still on
probation and lifetime probation is in itself cruel
and unusual punishment. This argument need not
detain us long. We cannot understand how a life-
time requirement of good behavior is too much to
ask of a habitual criminal.,,
4
89
In reality, the parole requirements are extremely
light. After the defendant is paroled he must com-
plete three years of monthly reporting, after which
he may be placed on annual reporting status. This
annual report can be completed by mail. After four
mailed-in reports, the parolee may attain nonre-
porting status.
4 90
The arguments reduce to a consideration of the
vested rights theory and the real world analysis.
The question of the better argument is practically
dispositive since many would consider a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole as excessive.
This article submits that the real world consid-
eration ought to carry the day under the eighth
amendment proportionality analysis. First, the real
world concept does not work an affirmative injus-
tice. The Rummels of the world will be able to
litigate the question of excessiveness at an appro-
priate time. The contrary rule has grave implica-
tions for an indeterminate sentencing scheme. The
purpose here is not to argue that an indeterminate
sentencing scheme is the appropriate legislative
response, only that the eighth amendment allows
the adoption of either a determinate or indetermi-
nate scheme. The prevailing penological theory
swings wildly between the two theories. Indeter-
minate schemes were roundly approved in the
Supreme Court in Williams v. New York.4 9'
489 587 F.2d at 659 n.19.
490 Brief for Respondent at 28, Rummel v. Estelle, 100
S. Ct. 1133.
491 Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize
a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the
punishment should fit the offender and not merely
the crime. The belief no longer prevails that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and
habits of a particular offender .... Today's philoso-
phy of individualizing sentences makes sharp dis-
tinctions for example between first and repeated
offenders. Indeterminate sentences, the ultimate ter-
mination of which are sometimes decided by non-
judicial agencies, have to a large extent taken the
place of the old rigidly fixed punishments. The
practice of probation which relies heavily on non-
judicial implementation has been accepted as a wise
policy.
337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949).
In the thirty years since Williams, penological
and public opinion has changed. According to the
American Bar Association Standards relating to
the Administration of Criminal Justice Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures, "an excessive indeter-
minacy has been built into many, if not most,
penal codes. 4 92 Moreover, according to a Justice
Department study, eighteen states enacted man-
datory sentencing laws during 1979 and five addi-
tional states adopted fixed term statutes to limit
judicial discretion in sentencing. The study con-
cludes that the clear national trend i s toward de-
terminative sentences and away from indetermi-
nate sentences. 4 93 Indeed, Time confidently de-
clared indeterminate sentences as "discredited the-
ory. ' '49 If, once again, indeterminate sentencing
schemes come into vogue, proportionality analysis
ought not to stand in the way.
In making the choice between two logical argu-
ments concerning the parole question, another fac-
tor strongly supports the real world view. This is
the presumption of constitutionality that is ac-
corded a legislative choice.
There are many problems with habitual criminal
statutes, especially ones that sweep as broadly as
the Texas statute. However, the state has been able
to demonstrate by very strong evidence that a
prisoner such as Rummel will (1) serve ten to
fourteen years in prison, (2) report monthly for
three years, (3) report annually for four years by
mail, and (4) assume nonreporting status for life.
49
'
The Texas scheme of punishment gradually al-
492 Draft approved by the ABA, August 14, 1979. More
specifically, the ABA strongly recommends a revamping
of habitual statutes generally. See Standard 18-4.4.
493 See 23 States Enact Laws Limiting Judges' Discretion,
Houston Post, March 24, 1980, § A, at 23. There is, of
course, no consensus in the scholarly literature on this
point. Compare Reid, A Rebuttal To The Attack On The
Indeterminate Sentence, 51 WASH. L. REv. 565 (1976), with
Bruce, Burgess & Harno, A Study Of The Indeterminate
Sentence and Parole In The State Of Illinois, 19 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & C. 1, 63 (Part II) (1928).
'94 Making The Crimes Fit The Times, TIME, April 28,
1980, at 65.
Ironically, indeterminate sentences have been criti-
cized because parole authorities have been too liberal in
releasing offenders. A recent edition of the Wall Street
Journal headlined with a story about the public outcry
that resulted from the Georgia Parole Board's decision to
release a prisoner serving a life term after ten years. The
prisoner had kidnapped a young woman and buried her
alive. Guarding The Gates, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1979, at 1.
195 "Available statistics indicate that approximately 40
percent of inmates are granted parole in their first year
of eligibility. Of those passed over, more than 64 percent
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lows the habitual offender more freedom. The
eighth amendment speaks of punishments and not
merely sentences. A court ought not to strike down
a punishment scheme unless the entire scheme is
excessive. It is much too narrow to look only at the
express sentence under the eighth amendment.
Take the example of the United States habitual
offender statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 provides for a
twenty-five-year sentence for certain habitual of-
fenders. Under this statute the offender may gain
discretionary release after serving about sixteen
years in prison. Given a choice, would an of-
fender choose to serve a life sentence in Texas or a
twenty-five-year sentence in federal prison? Can
we say that the eighth amendment answers this
question as a constitutional matter?497 In Rummel,
the Supreme Court properly concluded that parole




THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AND THE ROLE OF AN
APPELLATE COURT
In his dissent to the panel opinion in Rummel,
Judge Thornberry expressed the opinion that the
majority's opinion represented the "slippery slope
in its most classic sense. , 49 This section addresses
this single most important consideration in propor-
tionality analysis and advocates that the insuper-
able problems associated with the slippery slope
call for a rejection of activist intervention by the
courts under a proportionality analysis.
The Rummel Panel Standard
The Fifth Circuit panel opinion suggested that
if any one of the underlying offenses involved
"violence, a potential for violence, or a strong social
interest"' 5 a life sentence would be constitutional.
are granted parole in their second year of eligibility. By
the third and fourth year of eligibility, the figure ap-
proaches 100 percent." Brief for Respondent at 24, Rum-
mel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133.
496 18 U.S.C. § 3575 does have the advantage of being
more finely tailored than the Texas statute.
497 18 U.S.C. § 4161 provides that a federal prisoner
may earn a maximum of ten days per month good time
credit.
"' Rummel makes no argument that a 10- to 12-year
sentence would be unconstitutional; however, if we con-
sider the life sentence as an indeterminate sentence pre-
cluding parole for ten years, this sentence is suspect in
California under the Goss rationale.
09 568 F.2d at 1202.
-'o0 Id. at 1196.
Consistent with this standard, a later Fifth Circuit
panel upheld the imposition of a life sentence on a
defendant convicted of two burglaries and a for-
gery in Chapman v. Estelle.5° ' The Fourth Circuit
rejected a Hart challenge to a life sentence when
the underlying offenses were grand larceny, break-
ing and entering a grocery store, and burglary of
a residence in Griffin v. Warden.5°2 If one is forced to
assume that the life sentence must be considered
one for the natural life of the offender, is it any
more conscionable to imprison Chapman and Grif-
fin for life than Rummel and Hart?
The distinction between nonviolent and violent
crimes, between those crimes witl potential for
violence and those crimes with no potential for
violence, and those crimes with a strong social
interest, is almost an impossible distinction to make
in practice. This is demonstrated by the following
taken from the oral argument in the Rummel case:
Question (Burger): Suppose in each offense case you
had exactly the same amount involved, that it was
the theft of a welfare check going to a welfare
recipient, what would be your position?
Answer: [defendant] ... [S]ince stealing whatever
amount from a welfare victim presumably consti-
tutes the same offense under Texas law, regardless
of the identity of the victim, we would argue that
the harm should make no difference in this court's
analysis....
Question (White): How about embezzlement?
Answer: [defendant] Embezzlement... gives me
somewhat more trouble than the normal petty check
offense.
Question (White): Why should it? You just drew
the line, and embezzlement certainly falls on the
nonviolent side.
Answer: [defendant] Yes, Your Honor, but, Mr.
Justice White, embezzlement cases often indicate
professional criminality, and we... argue that if we
are dealing with professional criminals, someone
who forges three $100,000 checks-
Question (White): How about tax evasion?
Answer...
50' 593 F.2d 687, 688 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). "[E]ven the
original panel in Rumme... would likely reject [the
eighth amendment] claim." Id
m 517 F.2d 756.
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Question (White): What about three times?
Answer...
Question...
Answer: [defendant] Absolutely, the court ought
not to consider an eighth amendment claim under
those circumstances.
Question (White): Why, is it completely nonviolent?
Answer: [defendant] Yes, Your Honor, but, it rep-
resents an area in which the state has a peculiarly
strong interest in preserving the integrity of the tax
process, and we feel it is probably entitled to receive
special treatment by the courts....
Question (White): [W]hat about just a compulsive
con man who just goes around conning people out
of money, with false schemes, especially children
and old ladies? ...
Question (White): (Consider that the state based
this conclusion on three convictions.)
Answer: [defendant] (The state could not.)
Question (White): Then it turns on the number, in
effect? If it were seven rather than three, the case
should come out differently?
Answer: [defendant] (Difficult to argue against.)
Question (White): What about four?
Answer: [defendant] By far the most difficult line
drawing question here. I cannot tell this court where
the line ought to be drawn.
Question (White): Well, you are though.
Answer: [defendant] I can only tell this court that
wherever that line is drawn, it ought not be at
three.50°
The Supreme Court opinion in Rummel fully
recognizes these difficulties. The opinion makes
clear that the amount of money stolen by Rummel
is of little probative value. The opinion suggests
that Rummel could have stolen no money and this
fact would prove only that he is an unsuccessful
thief, not that Rummel is blameless.-*4 Moreover,
the Court discounted the distinction between vio-
so3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-9, Rummel v.
Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (Jan. 6, 1980) [hereinafter Tran-
critO].
W100 S. Ct. at 1140.
lent and nonviolent crimes. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
suggested that Caesar's death was violent, but that
the death of Hamlet's father by poison was not
violent, yet the social interest in preventing both
murders is equal.5°5
The Special Social Interest Exception
The Rummel panel suggested that in addition to
the violent/nonviolent distinction, certain crimes
involve a special social interest. The panel further
suggested that laws concerning drugs have a special
social interest. 5°6 Other courts dealing with the
proportionality problem have not shared the Fifth
Circuit's view. In People v. Lorentzen507 the Michigan
Supreme Court struck down a marijuana penalty,
but in People v. Stewart s it upheld a stiff sentence
for -a heroin offense. Apparently, the Michigan
Supreme Court only partially agrees with the Fifth
Circuit. In Downey v. Perini 9 and in Davis v. Davis to
the Sixth and Fourth Circuits respectively struck
down penalties for marijuana offenses as dispro-
portionate. The California Supreme Court -has
never recognized a special societal interest in drugs,
as a clear majority of the California cases strike
down drug related penalties. The Second Circuit,
however, in Ward v. Carmona5 ' apparently accepted
the Fifth Circuit's formulation, at least as to nar-
cotic drugs.
The concept of a special social interest is invalid.
If a state has a sufficient reason to legitimately
prohibit some conduct as a felony, it is mere judi-
cial force of will to say that some laws represent a
special interest and are therefore immune from
proportionality scrutiny.
The Flood
A related problem to the slippery slope is the
problem of a flood of litigation. The petitioner in
Rummel and the state of Texas engaged in a reckless
discussion concerning the number of cases gener-
ated in Texas under the habitual criminal stat-
ute. 512 The effect in Texas is, of course, only the tip
of the iceberg. The proportionality analysis,
adopted by the Supreme Court, applies to every
5o5' Id. at 1143 n.27.
506 568 F.2d at 1198.
507 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827.
'08 400 Mich. 540, 256 N.W.2d 31 (1977).
'09 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on othergrounds,
423 U.S. 823 (1976).510 601 F.2d 153.
s1 576 F.2d 405.
512 Compare Brief for Petitioner at 66 n.83, Rummel v.
Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, with Brief for Respondent at 30,
Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133.
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sentence in every American jurisdiction. The Fifth
Circuit panel opinion in Rummel suggested that
proportionality analysis might be limited to death
and life sentences; 5 3 however, such a suggestion is
unsound. It would be an outrageous result to in-
quire into the excessiveness of a life sentence and
not consider a sixty-year sentence.1 4
The mere proof of a flood of litigation certainly
should not deter a court from upholding the con-
stitutional rights of litigants. It is, however, a per-
missible factor to consider when considering the
difficult questions of standards. Rummel argues
that "[I]ower state courts have employed similar
tests [to the proportionality test] for years without
being deluged by litigation."5 15 While this state-
ment is true, it overlooks the fact that in every state
that has adopted proportionality analysis, the state
shortly thereafter adopted a flood-stopping device
to stem the tide of litigation. Some of the flood-
stopping analysis is plainly illogical and supporta-
ble only to the extent that the state court has the
power to stop the flood as a matter of state law.
The South Carolina Supreme Court interdicted
a prison sentence in State v. Kimbrough5 16 under
the proportionality principle. Shortly after
Kimbrough,5 " the South Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted Kimbrough to apply only when the stat-
ute itself is unconstitutional.1 8
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted propor-
tionality analysis in People v. Lorentzen,519 in an
extremely broad opinion for a sale of a small
amount of marijuana. When given the opportunity
to extent the analysis to heroin cases the Michigan
Supreme Court summarily rejected it without any
effort to distinguish the case.52°
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held two life
sentences without the possibility of parole uncon-
513 568 F.2d at 1196.
514 Moreover, one must question if the mandatory
nature of a selected penalty has any place in the propor-
tionality analysis. It would seem that it should make no
difference if the selected penalty were picked from a
fishbowl. See McQuaid v. Smith, 556 F.2d 595 (1st Cir.
1977) (upholding mandatory penalty for one year im-
prisonment for carrying a firearm without a license).
515 Brief for Petitioner at 14, Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S.
Ct. 1133.
516 46 S.E.2d 273.
517 Interestingly, the punishment in Kimbrough was se-
lected by the trial judge. Rummel argues that such a
sentence is immune from review under the eighth amend-
ment.
51s State v. Scates, 46 S.E.2d 693.
5'9 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827.
520 See note 268 supra.
stitutional for two young rapists. 52 1 But when faced
with considering the same sentence imposed on an
offender a few years older, the Kentucky court
simply stated that the rule of the prior two cases
did not apply.
522
The California experience with the proportion-
ality test represents both the flood-stopping con-
cept and the flood.sss After the intermediate ap-
pellate courts in California were reading In re Lynch
in a totally unpredictable manner, the California
Supreme court in In re Wingo stopped the flood of
litigation by holding that attacks to an indetermi-
nate sentence were premature until the California
adult authority set a release date.
Certainly, the proportionality analysis must be
applied to an extraordinarily broad range of crim-
inal sentences and the vast majority of state court
flood-stopping devices cannot appropriately be ap-
plied to stop the potential flood.sss
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Beyond the problem of the slippery slope is the
question of the appropriate role of the appellate
court in the proportionality analysis. One respected
observer has noted that appellate review of sen-
tences "would administer the coup de grace to courts
of appeals as we know them.
' sss
Almost all courts that have considered propor-
tionality analysis have recognized that the court's
role in reviewing legislatively selected sentences is
a limited one. Arguably there have been exceptions
to this rule, most probably in California. There are
521 See note 454 supra.
52 See note 455 supra.
" See notes 269-93 & accompanying text supra. The
California Supreme Court's experience also demonstrates
the proportionality test run riot. In In re Grant, 18 Cal.
3d 1, 553 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, a plurality of the
court struck down all minimum sentences for recidivist
narcotics offenders. In In re Carter, 125 Cal. Rptr. 177, a
California appellate judge joined in an opinion striking
down a part of a sentence providing for a five-year parole
preclusion for a recidivist narcotics offender convicted of
possession of heroin with the statement that the sentence
could not be "found to be out of proportion to the offense
when tested against any rational standard." Id. at 180
(Puglia, P.J., concurring).
5 The California timing case is a probable exception.
Such a device could be constitutionally used for the
proportionality test. Another possible flood-stopping de-
vice for the federal courts is a habeas corpus preclusion
similar to that of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
5 H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISIDIcTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 36 (1973). Judge Friendly suggest that the flood of
litigation would not be caused by an increase in existing
appeals from conviction but by appeals from the 90




suggestions in some opinions that fail to follow this
fundamentally sound advice. For example, a fa-
mous passage in Hart v. Coiner argues that
"[t]radition, custom, and common sense reserve [a
life sentence] for those violent persons who are
dangerous to others. It is not a practical solution to
petty crime in America. Aside from the proportion-
ality principle, there aren't enough prisons in
America to hold all the Harts that afflict us."
5 26
It is impossible to deny that compassion and a
sense of justice must obviously play a part in the
judging process. However, one must question if
nonelected, lifetime officials should determine if
there is enough prison space for the Harts of oir
nation.
527
One cannot deny that banner headlines pro-
claiming that the Supreme Court upholds a life-
time sentence for the petty criminal holds no public
allure for a population looking to its highest court
to provide justice. I hope that this article demon-
strates that despite the compelling case of William
Rummel, the injustice to Rummel is not what it at
first appears, and the cost in terms of neutral legal
principle far outweighs a reversal of the Fifth Cir-
526 483 F.2d at 141.
527 Compare with Judge Thornberry's opening in dis-
sent to the Rummel panel:
Perhaps, if I were the prosecutor, I would not have
sought an indictment charging the defendant with
cuit result. There is no better way to conclude than
this passage from the oral argument:
528
Question (White): Well, what kind of a standard do
you think we ought to have?
Answer: [defendant] Your Honor, the standard
ought to be-and I think the Court could enact a
fairly narrow standard if it chose-
Question (Stewart): Enact?52
a habitual count; if I were a state lawmaker I would
vote to amend the statute so that it would not be
applied as has been done here, or if I were governor
of the State of Texas, I would consider the petitioner
a prime candidate for clemency. But, I do not hold
these offices and my decision must be guided by the
eighth amendment rather than my feelings of com-
passion and justice.
568 F.2d at 1201.
528 Transcript, supra note 503, at 48.
52 On October 3, 1980, a federal judge in the Western
District of Texas granted William Rummel's application
for habeas corpus relief. This finding was based on Rum-
mel's trial attorney's failure to investigate and interview
potential witnesses. Rummel v. Estelle, No. SA-76-CA-20
(W.D. Tex., Oct. 3, 1980). Rummel was freed November
14, 1980, after he pled guilty to theft by false pretenses
and, under a plea bargaining agreement, a court set his
sentence at time served. Two-Bit Lifer Finally Freed-After
Pleading Guilty, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 15, 1980, 1, at 2,
col. 3.
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